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BEAUTY AND THE WELL-DRAWN
ORDINANCE: AVOIDING VAGUENESS AND
OVERBREADTH CHALLENGES TO MUNICIPAL
AESTHETIC REGULATIONS
Randall . Cude*
Shall that dirty roll of bunting in the gun-house be all the
colors a village can display? A village is not complete
unless it have these trees to mark the season in it. They are
important, like the town clock. A village that has them not
will not be found to work well. It has a screw loose, an
essential part is wanting ....
A village needs these innocent stimulants of bright and
cheering prospects to keep off melancholy and supersti-
tion.
INTRODUCTION
Since Henry David Thoreau wrote about the importance of a
neighborhood's beauty in fostering civic pride one hundred thirty-
six years ago,2 philosophers, architects and legal scholars have
wrestled with the significance of aesthetics3 to a community and
* Brooklyn Law School Class of 1999; B.Arch., Southern California Institute
of Architecture, 1980. The author is a licensed architect in New York. The
author wishes to thank Stefanie Kraus for her editorial talent and advice.
' Henry David Thoreau, Autumnal Tints, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 1862,
at 387, 396.
2 Id.
' Aesthetic is defined as "relating to the beautiful as distinguished from the
merely pleasing, the moral, and especially the useful and utilitarian." WEBsTER's
NEW THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 34 (1981). This obtuse definition
illustrates the difficulty of defining the components of beauty. Sigmund Freud
noted that "the science of aesthetics... has been unable to give any explanation
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its citizens.' Is simply planting trees to beautify a community
enough, as Thoreau suggests, or is it appropriate for municipalities
to go further and enact ordinances that promote aesthetic values?5
Can objective laws be drawn to regulate a subjective social value
such as aesthetics? 6 The problem runs even deeper: inexplicit or
imprecise municipal aesthetic policies may leave citizens guessing
of the nature and origin of beauty,. . . [its] lack of success [has been] concealed
beneath a flood of resounding and empty words." SIGMUND FREUD, CIvILIZA-
TION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 32 (James Strachey ed. & trans., 1961).
4 See JOHN J. COSTONIS, ICONS AND ALIENS (1989) (discussing law and
aesthetics as they are applied to the historic preservation of the built environ-
ment); LE CORBUSIER, WHEN CATHEDRALS WERE WHITE 20-21 (Francis E.
Hyslop, Jr. trans., 1947) (criticizing the aesthetic regulation of modem
architecture in the United States and France) ("The spirit of France is not rule-
bound except in periods of lethargy and ossification. Today, when a new world
is surging up under the impulse of technical miracles, the officials of the City of
Light apply regulations. And soon there will be no light in the City."); ROGER
SCRUTON, THE AESTHETICS OF ARCHITECTURE (1979) (exploring the philosophy
and value of aesthetic taste in architecture and urban design); ROBERT VENTURI
ET AL., LEARNING FROM LAS VEGAS (1977) (discussing generally the symbolism
of signs and architectural ornament in creating aesthetic vitality in the built
environment). Costonis argues that the law unduly focuses on the "beauty"
standard, causing courts to judge the aesthetic justification of legal initiatives by
how visually pleasing the results are. COSTONIS, supra, at 20. Costonis instead
proposes a paradigm of "icons" (environmental elements which provide
communities with a sense of stability, order and reassurance) pitted against
"aliens" (intrusions that threaten these icons). COSTONIS, supra, at 46-47, 51. In
this paradigm, beauty need never necessarily enter into the equation. Although
existing environmental stability is encouraged, Constonis' paradigm does not
convincingly suggest how a city may enhance aesthetics through legal means,
such as regulations.
' A criticism of aesthetic regulations is that no objective criteria exists for
evaluating them. "Law knows nothing about beauty. It can set speed limits or
require that contracts be in writing, but it can neither create beauty nor issue
ukases guaranteeing that others will do so. The Constitution contains no recipe
for beauty." COSTONIS, supra note 4, at 9.
6 The Supreme Court has noted that "[municipal] aesthetic judgments are
necessarily subjective, defying objective evaluation, and for that reason must be
carefully scrutinized to determine if they are only a public rationalization of an
impermissible purpose." Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490,
510 (1981) (determining nonetheless that there was no impermissible purpose
behind the city's billboard regulations).
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about what conduct the law expects of them, and leave bureaucrats
uncertain about how to appropriately administrate the law.
To begin the examination of these issues, the difference
between "aesthetic regulations" and "aesthetics" as a legitimate
municipal interest must first be clarified. In this Note, the term
"aesthetic regulation" refers generally to statutes, ordinances and
regulations affecting the visual or aural aspects of communicative
activities protected under the First Amendment.7 These aspects
include the installation of newsracks, the litter created by leaflet-
ing, parades, street sales of artist works, signs and billboards, artist
murals, use of sound trucks, amplified speech, etcetera.9 On the
other hand, "aesthetics" is a legitimate municipal interest'0 capable
of justifying the enactment of municipal aesthetic regulations.
Aesthetics therefore encompasses both the societal goal of promot-
' The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
The First Amendment is applicable to state statutes via the Fourteenth
Amendment, see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 303 (1940), and to ordinances enacted by cities, see Lovell v. City of
Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938). Although the words of the First Amendment
facially establish an unconditional prohibition on the government's power to
enact laws regulating the protected freedoms, the Supreme Court has not
interpreted the amendment so as to provide unlimited rights for citizens to
engage in any expressive activity at any time. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ("The most stringent protection of free speech would not
protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing a panic.").
8 Newsracks are newspaper or leaflet distribution boxes, usually coin-
operated, and typically installed on city sidewalks and in other public places with
high pedestrian traffic. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Beacon Hill Architectural
Comm'n, 100 F.3d 175, 179 (1st Cir. 1996).
9 Aesthetic regulation may also refer to ordinances regulating zoning,
nuisance or the architectural appearance of buildings. This Note does not discuss
the drafting of these types of aesthetic regulations, which are more closely
connected to property rights than First Amendment freedoms.
10 The Supreme Court has determined that "public safety, public health,
public welfare, morality, peace and quiet, law and order" and national security
are some of the more conspicuous examples of other legitimate municipal
interests, but has not confined the list to these goals. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S.
26, 32 (1954) (endorsing Congressional authorization of the District of Columbia
Redevelopment Act of 1945 to eliminate the aesthetic detriment of slums and
substandard housing conditions through the use of eminent domain).
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ing beauty and also exists as a broad governmental justification for
the means employed to achieve that end. This distinction is
important because of its effect on the manner and types of speech
that the government may permissibly regulate.
Speech can be regulated by the government in two ways: the
government can restrict the dispensing of ideas and information
because of the viewpoint of the speaker or because of the effect of
the ideas or information on the listener, or the government can
restrict the flow of information, without censoring the ideas, in
order to pursue goals unrelated to the content of the speech."
Aesthetic ordinances typically fall into the latter form of regulation
because they limit the activity through which the information or
speech is dispensed without disturbing the message content.' 2
However, because of the difficulty of establishing legal standards
quantifying aesthetics, municipalities may struggle to draft
ordinances that both protect governmental aesthetic interests and
constitutionally regulate First Amendment activities. Adding to this
difficulty is the fact that while the Supreme Court ultimately
determines the constitutionality of any challenged regulation, the
Justices have historically chosen not to elaborate on statutory text
that would be constitutional under particular factual circum-
stances. 13 Therefore, practitioners wishing to draft aesthetic
11 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at
789 (2d ed. 1988).
12 TRIBE, supra note 11, § 12-2, at 790. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77,
83 (1949) (upholding the prohibition of over-amplified sound trucks in residential
neighborhoods).
13 For example, in Gregory v. City of Chicago, in which the Supreme Court
held that demonstrators arrested while conducting a peaceful march were arrested
for participation in the demonstration alone and not for their refusal to obey
police orders, Justice Black stated that "[i]t is not our duty and indeed not within
our power to set out and define with precision just what statutes can be lawfully
enacted to deal with situations like the one confronted here.. . ." 394 U.S. 111,
118 (1969) (Black, J., concurring). See also Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329,
2351 (1997) ("'[This] Court will not rewrite a [state] law to conform it to
constitutional requirements."') (quoting Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n,
484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988)); Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 121 (1990) (stating
that the judicial rewriting of statutes would derogate Congress' "incentive to draft
a narrowly tailored law in the first place").
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ordinances that regulate the time, place, and manner14 of the
expression of content-neutral 5 speech must to piece together and
evaluate conflicting court decisions in order to avoid vague and
overbroad 6 challenges to their own regulations. The confusion
14 Time, place, and manner regulations control access to a public forum for
communicative purposes, and are sustained by courts provided that they are
drafted and applied in a content-neutral manner. GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW § 12-4, at 1250 (12th ed. 1991). Judicial scrutiny of time, place,
and manner regulations primarily focuses on assuring that they are not pretexts
to control speech content, although certain cases also focus on verifying that
minimum access to the public forum is preserved. Id. § 12-4, at 1250-51. The
municipal interests normally advanced as justification for aesthetic regulations,
see supra note 10, are classified as only substantial or legitimate interests and
therefore do not usually survive the strict scrutiny requirement that the ordinance
be enacted to achieve a compelling government interest. See infra note 73 for
elements of the time, place, and manner test.
15 Content-neutral speech restrictions are justified by government interests
independent of the content of the speech and qualify for the application of the
time, place, and manner regulations. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461
(1980). In contrast, content-based restrictions on speech are presumptively
invalid. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (citations
omitted). See also City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46-47
(1986) ("This Court has long held that regulations enacted for the purpose of
restraining speech on the basis of its content presumptively violate the First
Amendment.") (citations omitted). Content-based regulations are therefore always
subject to strict scrutiny by courts, and it is necessary for the government to
show that the law "is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is
narrowly drawn to achieve that end." See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (citations
omitted). See Part L.A for further discussion of speech content and the applicable
levels of judicial scrutiny. Aesthetic ordinances are therefore much more likely
to withstand judicial scrutiny if they are content-neutral.
16 A regulation may be struck down for vagueness if its text is drafted with
such indefinite terms that ordinary citizens must guess at their meaning and
cannot determine what conduct is permissible. See Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104, 108-11 (1972). In contrast, a regulation may be struck down for
overbreadth if it over-regulates an activity over which the government may
otherwise exercise control. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,
507 U.S. 410, 423 (1993); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 793-94
(1989); City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 769-72
(1988). See Part L.A for a more detailed discussion of the vagueness and
overbreadth doctrines as applied to aesthetic ordinances.
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experienced by practitioners has resulted in numerous lawsuits
challenging aesthetic ordinances, despite substantial case law on the
subject. 17
This Note does not advocate a change in current First Amend-
ment jurisprudence affecting aesthetic regulations, but rather is
intended to assist practitioners in working with existing law by
suggesting textual organization and drafting standards for proposed
ordinances that will avoid vagueness or overbreadth challenges.
Part I of this Note discusses the doctrines of statutory vagueness
and overbreadth in general, associated First Amendment challenges,
and levels of judicial scrutiny for content-based and content-neutral
aesthetic regulations. Part I also examines the allowable extent of
time, place, and manner regulation within public fora,18 as well as
the emergence of aesthetics as a legitimate municipal interest. Part
II outlines the legal framework employed by courts to examine the
text of aesthetic regulations, and identifies substantive and
procedural factors that have been repeatedly emphasized by courts
in their analysis of vagueness and overbreadth challenges. Part II
also focuses on recent aesthetic regulations affecting speech and
communicative conduct in public fora having a heightened aesthetic
context, such as historic districts and special types of parks. Part III
17 See, e.g., Mark Johnson, ACLU Opposes Plan to Curb Signs, PROVIDENCE
(R.I.) JOURNAL-BULLETIN, May 8, 1997, at IC (reporting a challenge to a
proposed town ordinance restricting the use of political signs); Molly Kinetz,
Sign of Litigious Times, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 9, 1997, at NI (reporting a
lawsuit challenging a billboard ordinance that was settled after city officials
determined that the ordinance would not survive judicial scrutiny because of
overbroad drafting); John King, Brown Battles News Racks, S.F. CHRON., Mar.
4, 1997, at Al (noting that several cities, including San Francisco, are currently
wrestling with permissible newsrack regulation because of the imprecision of any
constitutional formula for ordinance drafting); Jesse Tinsley, Cleveland Hts.
Amends Code for 'For Sale' Signs, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), Aug. 6,
1997, at 413 (reporting that the city's zoning code was amended so as to loosen
the regulation of signs because of the threat of lawsuits).
18 A public forum, such as a street or park, is public property that may be
used for the purpose of communicative expression. See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S.
496, 515 (1939). Public fora provide an inexpensive and convenient location to
a speaker for reaching a large number of people with the speech message. See
infra note 38 for a discussion of the public forum doctrine.
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proposes a practitioner's guide for drafting aesthetic regulations that
will avoid vagueness and overbreadth challenges. Textual standards
are included for drafting the well-drawn ordinance, incorporating
judicially-emphasized elements such as municipal goals and means,
permissible delegation of enforcement authority and acceptable
permit and insurance procedures. Part III also outlines additional
considerations for textual language when a municipality seeks to
ban certain types of communicative conduct in public fora having
a heightened aesthetic context.
I. SPEECH, AESTHETICS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Municipal aesthetic regulations often partially abridge the right
of a citizen or group to engage in free expression, by reducing a
citizen's available means of communicating the message to the
public. 9 The administration of these regulations by city officials
often raises the constitutional question of whether the ordinance's
application impermissibly abridges First Amendment freedom of
speech or press rights.20 However, as Chief Justice Burger noted
in Metromedia, Inc. v City of San Diego,21 in which a city
ordinance prohibited certain types of outdoor billboards, 22 "to say
[that an] ordinance presents a First Amendment issue is not
necessarily to say that it constitutes a First Amendment viola-
tion.,
23
A court must first determine whether the challenger's expres-
sion is entitled to First Amendment protection. The Supreme Court
has identified four categories of speech that are each given varying
9 For example, in City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, an
ordinance prohibiting the posting of political campaign posters on utility pole
wires, which had been used in the past for this purpose, resulted in the reduced
availability of the candidate's political message to the public. 466 U.S. 789, 801-
02 (1984).
20 Id. at 803.
21 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
22 San Diego sought to ban the erection of outdoor billboards carrying non-
commercial advertising or commercial advertising for goods located off-site. Id.
at 493-94.
23 Id. at 561 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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levels of First Amendment protection: pure speech,24 speech plus
an associated activity,"5 symbolic speech, 6 and unprotected
speech.2 Although historically given the greatest First Amend-
28ment protection, even pure speech may be subject to reasonable
24 Pure speech exists independently from any associated activity, as in the
case of political speech. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 540-41 (1965)
(involving political songs and speeches made during a demonstration protesting
racial segregation).
2" Speech plus an associated activity is a hybrid form of speech combining
both speech and conduct, such as picketing or street performances of music. See
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 309 v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 474
(1950) (upholding a state court injunction against the picketing of a private
business).
26 Symbolic speech involves expression communicated primarily through
behavior, rather than words, such as the burning of a draft card, see United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968), or sleeping in a park in protest of
the government's policies for the homeless, see Clark v. Community for Creative
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
27 In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Court listed "the lewd and obscene,
the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words" as unprotected
speech, because those words "by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace." 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (citation
omitted). These types of speech are also not protected because "such utterances
are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." Id. (citation omitted).
See also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (noting that obscene or
profane communication is not protected because it depicts or describes "sexual
conduct in a patently offensive way" that appeals to the "prurient interest in sex"
and does not have "serious literary, political, artistic or scientific value").
28 Justice Cardozo characterized "freedom of thought[] and speech" as the
"indispensable condition[] of nearly every other form of freedom. . . . [A]
pervasive recognition of that truth can be traced in our history, political and
legal." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1937). Justice Brandeis
explained in Whitney v. California, that the Framers, "[r]ecognizing the
occasional tyrannies of governing majorities .... amended the Constitution so
that free speech and assembly should be guaranteed." 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927)
(Brandeis, J., concurring). Justice Stone suggested in United States v. Carolene
Products Co. that heightened scrutiny for restraints on freedom of expression was
justified: "There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which
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time, place, and manner regulations if it unreasonably interferes
with the rights of other citizens.29 When speech is associated with
an activity or is symbolic, the government may impose broader
time, place, and manner regulations than those applicable to pure
speech, provided that they are not based solely upon speech
content.30 Finally, unprotected speech may be prohibited by the
government altogether.3' Although aesthetic regulations typically
are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth."
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
29 In Hague v. CIO, the Supreme Court first recognized the existence of
public fora, noting that the freedom of speech right within the public fora was
not absolute and could be regulated to avoid interference with the public interest.
307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939). This relative, not absolute, privilege formed the
foundation for the evolution of the time, place, and manner doctrine. See infra
note 73 (discussing the application of the time, place, and manner test in
Supreme Court cases after Hague). For example, a city has the authority to act
in good faith to maintain peace and order, to assure that streets will be fit for
passenger and vehicular traffic and for other necessary ends of community life.
GUNTHER, supra note 14, § 12-4, at 1253. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536,
554-55 (1965); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 85 (1949) (barring trucks
equipped with sound devices emitting "loud and raucous" noises in residential
neighborhoods). In Cox, the demonstration included not only political speeches
but also picketing, singing and marching to the courthouse in the state capitol.
379 U.S. at 545-46. While the Court held that Louisiana defined its regulation
in unconstitutionally overbroad terms, it also determined that government could
enact nondiscriminatory restrictions on travel on city streets because a demonstra-
tion could place an intolerable burden on the essential flow of traffic. Id. at 554-
55. Even though such regulations would affect political speech, the Court stated
that "[g]overnmental authorities have the duty and responsibility to keep their
streets open and available for movement." Id.
30 Id. at 555. The Court specifically noted that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments do not provide the same type of freedoms to those who communi-
cate ideas by marching or picketing as to those who communicate through pure
speech, emphatically stating that "'it has never been deemed an abridgment of
freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because
the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language,
either spoken, written, or printed."' Id. (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage &
Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949)).
31 However, such prohibitions are still subject to a showing by the
government that there is a rational basis for the enactment of the regulation. See
Miller, 413 U.S. at 18 (upholding the conviction of appellant for mailing
unsolicited sexually explicit material in violation of a California statute, and
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seek to regulate the visual32 or aural33 aspects of communicative
activities, often concentrating on the means of dispensing
speech,34 any of the speech types may be implicated.
While the government may legitimately regulate communicative
activities35 in order to promote aesthetic interests,36 courts may
recognizing that "States have a legitimate interest in prohibiting dissemination
or exhibition of obscene material"). One of the few cases where quality of the
environment was used as a justification for a content-based regulation was Paris
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, in which the Court upheld the restriction of obscenity
in places of public accommodation. 413 U.S. 49, 58 (1973).
32 See generally City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466
U.S. 789 (1984) (upholding on aesthetic grounds a ban on posting signs on
public property); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981)
(upholding a ban of billboards on public property).
"3 See Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 78 (upholding an ordinance regulating the over-
amplification of sound trucks in residential neighborhoods).
34 See Vincent, 466 U.S. at 792 (regulating the use of cardboard signs
attached to utility pole crosswires to display political messages); City of
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 412 (1993) (regulating the
use of newsracks on public property).
3' Regulations limiting speech on public property create conflictbetween two
competing interests: while government has a duty to ensure that public property
will be used for the purpose for which it was dedicated, restrictions on freedom
of speech may conflict with this interest. See Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S.
147, 160 (1939) (holding that the purpose of keeping city streets clean and neat
by preventing litter caused by leafleting was an insufficient municipal interest to
justify speech restrictions in a public forum). The public forum doctrine is used
to strike a reasonable balance between these competing interests. See infra note
38 (discussing the public forum doctrine).
36 Aesthetic interests may also be affected by activities that are not
communicative. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,
129 (1978) (upholding the application of the New York City Landmarks
Preservation Law, which prevented the building of a multistory building above
the landmarked Grand Central Terminal, because such a building would have
been destructive to the Terminal's historic and aesthetic features); Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974) (upholding an ordinance restricting
land use to one-family dwellings because the legislature's exercise of discretion
was "reasonable, not arbitrary" and bore "a rational relationship to [the
permissible] state objective [of creating land-use legislation addressed to family
needs]"); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387-88 (1926)
(legitimizing public control of land through zoning ordinances); Welch v.
Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 108 (1909) (upholding a building height regulation which
AESTHETIC REGULATIONS 863
strike down legislation that is content-based, vague or overbroad,
even if the municipal interests are valid.37 Conversely, the
Supreme Court will uphold content-neutral regulations that are
appropriate to the nature of the public forum 38 and the asserted
in part served to visually preserve the Boston cityscape).
37 See Schneider, 308 U.S. at 162. But see Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104, 109-11 (1972) (holding that a noise ordinance prohibiting a person, on
grounds adjacent to a school in session, from willfully making noise that disturbs
the peace or good order of the school was not unconstitutionally vague or
overbroad). Simply because an impermissible application of a regulation can be
conceived is not enough to create vulnerability to an overbreadth challenge; for
a facial challenge to succeed, there must be a realistic danger that the regulation
will significantly compromise First Amendment rights as applied to parties not
before the court. Vincent, 466 U.S. at 799-800. Legal standards for vague and
overbroad challenges are examined in Part I.A. The factors analyzed by courts
in determining whether a regulation's text is vague or overbroad under the First
Amendment is presented in Part II.
38 The public forum doctrine provides that regulation of speech on
government property traditionally made available for public expression, such as
streets and sidewalks, and property that the government has opened for
expressive activity, such as the grounds of a government building, receive the
highest scrutiny and are upheld only if they are narrowly drawn to achieve a
substantial or compelling state interest. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (holding that the school mail system
was not a limited purpose public forum merely because the system had been
opened for periodic use by civic and church organizations). Other public
property, such as airports, receive a more limited review requiring that
regulations be reasonable and that the speech is not being censored because of
government disagreement with the speaker's view. See generally International
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992). The Supreme
Court has consistently taken a "forum-based" approach when assessing
regulations that seek to restrict speech protections on government property. See
id. at 678 (holding that an airport terminal operated by a public authority is a
non-public forum for speech, and a ban on solicitation of religious donations
need only satisfy a reasonableness standard); Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. However, the
Court's approach has undergone changes over the years. Compare Perry, 460
U.S. at 46 ("We have recognized that the 'First Amendment does not guarantee
access to property [for expressive activity] simply because it is owned or
controlled by the government."') (quoting United States Postal Serv. v. Council
of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981)), with Grayned, 408 U.S.
at 115 ("The right to use a public place for expressive activity may be restricted
only for weighty reasons.").
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governmental interest under the time, place, and manner doc-
trine.39 The relatively recent emergence of aesthetics as a legiti-
mate, although subjective, municipal interest, while expanding a
city's available justifications for aesthetic regulations, further
complicates the task of the municipal practitioner wishing to create
an ordinance capable of avoiding a vagueness or overbreadth
challenge.4"
The first recognition of the public forum doctrine occurred with Justice
Robert's frequently quoted dictum in Hague v. CIO, in which he stated that
public streets and parks "have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the
public, and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions." 307
U.S. 496, 515 (1939). While the use of these public spaces for the communica-
tion of views "may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but
relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and
convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in
the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied." Id. at 516. Prior to Hague, the
prevailing law regarding the regulation of speech on public property was
contained in Justice (then Judge) Holmes' opinion in Commonwealth v. Davis,
a case in which a defendant was convicted of speaking in a commons area
without a permit. 39 N.E. 113 (Mass. 1895), aff'd, Davis v. Massachusetts, 167
U.S. 43 (1897). Holmes stated, in upholding the conviction, that "for the
Legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or
public park is no more an infringement of the rights of a member of the public
than for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house." Id. at 113. See
infra note 74, discussing the public forum types.
" See supra note 14, discussing time, place, and manner regulations. See
generally Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (holding New
York City's sound amplification guideline valid under the First Amendment as
a reasonable place and manner regulation of protected speech because of the
city's desire to control noise and maintain the character of Central Park); Clark
v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 297-98 (1984) (holding
that a National Park Service regulation permitting camping only in designated
campgrounds was narrowly focused on the Government's interest in maintaining
the parks of the nation's capitol in an attractive and intact condition and that the
prohibition of sleeping in connection with a demonstration in Lafayette Park and
the National Mall was justified as a reasonable time, place, and manner
restriction). See infra Part I.B for a more detailed discussion of the time, place,
and manner doctrine.
40 The history and emergence of aesthetics as an autonomous municipal
interest justifying time, place, and manner regulations is examined in Part I.C.
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A. Vagueness and Overbreadth Challenges4' and the
Appropriate Level of Scrutiny
A municipal aesthetic regulation is unconstitutional on its
face 42 if the language of the ordinance is either vague or
overbroad.43 The Supreme Court has developed extensive First
4' For a complete discussion of the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines as
applied to challenges under the First Amendment, see TRIBE, supra note 11,
§ § 12-27 to 12-33, at 1022-39; Lawrence A. Alexander, Is There an Overbreadth
Doctrine?, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 541 (1985); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making
Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853 (1991).
42 A statute or ordinance is void on its face, and therefore unconstitutional,
if it "'does not aim specifically at evils within the allowable area of [govern-
ment] control, but ... sweeps within its ambit other activities that constitute an
exercise' of protected expression or associated rights. TRIBE, supra note 11,
§ 12-27, at 1022 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940) (holding
that a statute prohibiting all picketing is void on its face because it bans peaceful
picketing protected by the First Amendment)). Facial invalidation analysis
typically compares the statutory line defining the limits of the regulated conduct
with the judicial line specifying protected and unprotected First Amendment
activities. TRIBE, supra note 11, § 12-27, at 1022. A statute will usually be found
facially invalid when every application of the statute creates an impermissible
risk of suppression of ideas and there is uncontrolled enforcement discretion by
an official. See Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 560-61 (1948) (invalidating an
ordinance that prohibited the use of a loudspeaker in public places without
permission of the chief of police who had unlimited discretion); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307 (1940) (invalidating an ordinance that required
a license to distribute religious literature without providing standards for the
exercise of licensing discretion); Hague, 307 U.S. at 516 (invalidating a statute
allowing a city to deny a permit for a public demonstration subject only to the
uncontrolled discretion of the director of public safety).
4' For example, in City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., Section
901.181 of the Codified Ordinances, City of Lakewood, stated that "[t]he Mayor
shall either deny the application [for a permit], stating the reasons for such denial
or grant said permit subject to the following terms . . . ," with Section 901.181
(c) providing the terms for such denial, including: "(7) such other terms and
conditions deemed necessary and reasonable by the Mayor." 486 U.S. 750, 769
(1988) (striking an ordinance authorizing the mayor to grant or deny applications
for annual permits to publishers to place their newsracks on public property
without providing limiting terms and conditions for approval). The Court
determined that the ordinance was impermissibly overbroad because it provided
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Amendment jurisprudence in this area, although the vagueness and
overbreadth doctrines have primarily been applied in cases
involving statutes or ordinances that seek explicitly to regulate
speech content,44 or that implicitly have that effect.s Challenged
aesthetic regulations usually fall into the latter category because
they are typically content-neutral on their face. The challenge is
usually based on the assertion that the regulation impermissibly
forecloses an available method or means of communication, not
that the regulation was specifically drawn to regulate speech
content.46 An ordinance drawn without specificity implicates a
vagueness challenge whereas the application of the ordinance to
regulate beyond constitutional bounds implicates an overbreadth
challenge. 47 Although First Amendment challenges to aesthetic
ordinances will often be made on both vagueness and overbreadth
grounds, each of the doctrines are different.
A vagueness challenge is based on the constitutional recognition
that a law's text must provide fair and adequate notice to those
whose conduct is intended to be regulated, so that persons of
the Mayor with unbridled discretion to grant permits. Id. at 771-72.
44 See Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 102 (1972) (invalidating a
Chicago disorderly conduct ordinance that barred picketing within 150 feet of a
school, but exempted peaceful picketing of a school involved in a labor dispute,
because it discriminatorily treated certain types of picketing differently).
45 Government bans on a certain medium or format of expression may have
this effect, although such an effect does not automatically invalidate an
ordinance. See City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.
789, 803-04 (1984) (upholding the regulation of political signs on public
property, because of the Court's determination that there was "not even a hint of
bias or censorship in the City's enforcement of th[e] ordinance"); Metromedia,
Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 512-13 (1981) (striking a regulation
banning non-commercial billboard advertising by an onsite occupant, while
allowing commercial onsite billboard advertising). See also GUNTHER, supra note
14, § 12-3 at 1216.
46 See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 416,
428-29 (1993) (sustaining a challenge to the city's selective and categorical ban
on the distribution of commercial handbills through the medium of newsracks
because the city did not meet its burden of establishing a "reasonable fit"
between safety and aesthetics and the means chosen to serve those interests);
Vincent, 466 U.S. at 803-04.
47 See TRIBE, supra note 11, § 12-27, at 1022, § 12-31, at 1033.
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common intelligence are not required to guess at the meaning and
application of the ordinance to determine their conduct.48 An
ordinance is therefore vulnerable to a void-for-vagueness challenge
when it is drafted with proscriptive terms so indefinite that the line
between permissible and impermissible conduct is unclear, and the
legislative body could practically have drafted the ordinance more
precisely.49 Aesthetic ordinances are challenged on vagueness
grounds when the enacted regulation provides either confusing
enforcement standards for municipal officials,5" or imprecise
requirements for permissible communicative expression or
conduct." Consequently, unconstitutionally vague statutes risk
creating a "chilling effect ' 52 on the expression of protected speech
and are subject to facial invalidation.
4' The Supreme Court's method of inquiry in cases involving vagueness
challenges was developed in the context of criminal statutes. See United States
v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1947) (establishing general standards for a First
Amendment challenge of a criminal statute under the vagueness doctrine);
Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1926) (discussing
situations in which the vagueness doctrine may be applied).
41 See Petrillo, 332 U.S. at 7-8. In Petrillo, a challenge was made to the
criminal statutory language of the Communications Act of 1934, which
prohibited the coercion of radio broadcast licensees to employ more persons than
needed by the licensee to perform actual work. Id. at 4. Specifically, the term
"number of employees needed by such licensee," was challenged for defining the
crime in excessively vague terms. Id. at 5. The Court determined that Congress
drafted the statute with sufficiently precise language to provide an adequate
warning as to the proscribed conduct, and therefore the statute was held
constitutional. Id. at 7.
'o See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 770
(1988) (noting that explicit textual regulatory standards are required to prevent
the unbridled discretion of enforcement officials). Similarly, a facial challenge
may be made on overbreadth grounds whenever a licensing law gives a
government official or agency substantial power to discriminate based upon
speech content by censoring disfavored speech or disliked speakers. Id. at 759.
5' Id. at 753.
52 The Supreme Court is wary of the inhibitory effects of imprecise statutory
text on free speech, stating "[t]hose sensitive to the perils posed by. . . indefinite
language, avoid the risk.., only by restricting their conduct to that which is
unquestionably safe. Free speech may not be so inhibited." Baggett v. Bullitt,
377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964) (invalidating loyalty oath requiring that state teachers
swear "undivided allegiance" to the United States Government).
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In contrast, a statute can be quite specific and yet still be
facially overbroad. 3 An ordinance is overbroad when activities
legitimately subject to government regulation are regulated by
"means which sweep unnecessarily broadly ... thereby invad[ing]
the area of protected freedoms. 54 An overbreadth challenge is
typically made to aesthetic regulations when the ordinance over-
regulates or prohibits constitutionally protected activity55 or
creates an opportunity for an enforcement official to exercise
content-based discretion.
56
However, when an ordinance regulates expressive conduct, as
opposed to pure speech, the effect of the ordinance, both on the
curtailment of speech and the advancement of the stated municipal
"s GUNTHER, supra note 14, § 12-1, at 1202. A vagueness challenge is
usually made to the constitutionality of a law on its face, because citizens in
general do not have notice of permissible conduct, even if the particular
defendant clearly understands the law "as applied" to his own actions. GUNTHER,
supra note 14, § 12-1, at 1191. In an overbreadth challenge, the regulation is
typically challenged both on its face in order to avoid the "chilling effects" of
the law on third parties not before the court, and also "as applied" to the
particular defendant. GUNTHER, supra note 14, § 12-1, at 1191. Both a vague or
an overbroad regulation may be invalidated both "as applied" and on its face.
GUNTHER, supra note 14, § 12-1, at 1191.
14 NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307, 309 (1964) (applying the general
standard for determining a law's validity in an overbreadth challenge, the Court
found that the failure of the NAACP to register under Alabama's corporate
registration and business qualification laws did not thereby oust the NAACP
from operating in the state and restrict the freedom of its members to associate
for the collective advocacy of ideas).
" See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114-15 (1972) (holding
that a noise ordinance prohibiting excessive noise adjacent to a school in session
was not vague because it prohibited with fair warning only actual, imminent or
willful interference with school activity).
56 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 794 (1989) (upholding
a regulation which allegedly allowed city officials to provide inadequate sound
for performers in a park bandshell based on the content of their speech); Plain
Dealer, 486 U.S. at 755 (holding unconstitutional a city ordinance giving the
mayor "unbridled discretion" to determine standards for installation of newsracks
on public property). The vagueness and overbreadth doctrines may merge in
certain situations. For example, an ordinance providing vague textual standards
may also be challenged on the ground that the exercise of discretion by the
enforcement official is overbroad. See Plain Dealer, 486 U.S. at 770.
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interests, is also assessed.57 In such situations, the Supreme Court
requires that the ordinance's "'overbreadth ... must not only be
real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's
plainly legitimate sweep.' ,58 A challenge for overbreadth to an
ordinance regulating expressive conduct can therefore only be
successful when the protected expression is a significant part of the
law's target, and the law's application can realistically curtail the
expression impermissibly. 9 Because aesthetic regulations usually
specifically target the visual or aural aspects of the dissemination
of speech-in other words, conduct-a challenger can usually make
a showing that substantial overbreadth exists if the court finds the
ordinance generally overbroad.'
The overbreadth doctrine is particularly applicable to aesthetic
ordinances lacking clear permit fee requirements as well as
approval procedures for permission to engage in the expression.6'
5' See Sciarrino v. City of Key West, 83 F.3d 364, 369 (1lth Cir. 1996)
(examining anecdotal evidence to determine the success of a handbill regulation
ordinance designed to prevent sidewalk congestion and litter). Cf Roulette v.
City of Seattle, 97 F.3d 300, 303-04 (9th Cir. 1996) (relying on evidence of
issued summonses and permits to hold that an ordinance prohibiting sitting or
lying on a public sidewalk between 7:00 a.m. and 9:00 p.m. in commercial areas
of the city does not facially restrain expression).
5' TRIBE, supra note 11, § 12-28, at 1025 (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma,
413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973)). This restrictive language was adopted by the Court
in reaction to overuse of the overbreadth doctrine during the final years of the
Warren Court in the late 1960's and early 1970's. GUNTHER, supra note 14,
§ 12-1, at 1194. See also Fallon, supra note 41, at 853; Martin H. Redish, The
Warren Court, The Burger Court and the First Amendment Overbreadth
Doctrine, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 1031, 1056-69 (1983).
59 TRIBE, supra note 11, § 12-27, at 1022.
60 See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 47 (1994) (invalidating
an ordinance banning residential signs except those for identification, security or
real estate sales purposes); Cleveland Area Bd. of Realtors v. City of Euclid, 88
F.3d 382, 388 (6th Cir. 1996) (sustaining challenger's assertion that a complete
ban on lawn signs was substantially overbroad because it burdened more speech
than necessary to serve the stated municipal interest of aesthetics).
6' Grayned v. City of Rockford involved just such a situation. 408 U.S. 104
(1972). The Court held that the ordinance, which prohibited excessive noise
adjacent to a school, was narrowly tailored to furthering the city's interest in
conducting undisrupted school classes, only punished imminently disruptive
conduct, and was not content-based. Id. at 119. The Court noted that "it is a
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Unclear procedures can lead city officials to impermissibly exercise
enforcement discretion that over-censors otherwise protected First
Amendment activities.62 Unfortunately, courts, including the
Supreme Court, only analyze the language of the specific ordinance
that has been challenged. When striking down the aesthetic
regulations, courts do not prescribe language that would have
avoided the challenge.63 Consequently, observing legislators must
speculate as to how to avoid constitutional challenges to their own
ordinances."
Once an aesthetic ordinance curtailing protected speech has
been challenged on vagueness or overbreadth grounds, the level of
scrutiny that will be applied is determined by the reviewing court.
The determination of the appropriate level of scrutiny is based upon
the court's finding of whether the regulation is content-neutral or
content-based.65 In contemporary cases, the Supreme Court uses
basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its
prohibitions are not clearly defined," id. at 108, whereas "[a] clear and precise
enactment may nevertheless be 'overbroad' if in its reach it prohibits constitu-
tionally protected conduct." Id. at 114. See also Ernest H. Schopler, Annotation,
Supreme Court's Views as to Overbreadth of Legislation in Connection with First
Amendment Rights, 45 L. Ed. 2d 725 (1976 & Supp. 1996) (discussing the
substantive aspects of the overbreadth doctrine and the merits of challenges in
specific illustrative fields of legislation).
62 See supra note 50 (referring to the overbroad text of the licensing law that
was the subject of challenge in City ofLakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co.,
which gave government officials the power to discriminate based on speech
content).
63 See supra note 13 (noting that courts will not rewrite vague or overbroad
regulations to conform to constitutional requirements).
6' See supra note 17 (listing recent news articles discussing pending
challenges to aesthetic regulations of various types).
65 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Beacon Hill Architectural Comm'n, 100 F.3d 175, 183 (1st
Cir. 1996) (determining that Boston's Street Furniture Guidelines did not have
a content-based impact on newspapers). For an examination of the Supreme
Court's recent approach to the regulation of speech content in "cyber-fora," such
as the internet, see Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2346 (1997) (holding the
Communications Decency Act, which prohibited the transmission of indecent
communication to minors, to be an unconstitutional content-based restriction
because of its vagueness and overbreadth).
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the standard announced in Ward v. Rock Against Racism,66 in
which the Court stated:
The principal inquiry in determining content neutrality, in
speech cases generally and in time, place or manner cases
in particular, is whether the government has adopted a
regulation of speech because of disagreement with the
message it conveys .... A regulation that serves purposes
unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral,
even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or
messages but not others.67
As part of the inquiry into a law's regulation of content, courts
often reassure themselves that the challenged ordinance is not a
pretext for censorship.68 In fact, substantial portions of case
opinions are devoted to examining the legislative record, the stated
municipal interests in the ordinance text and the means intended to
achieve these interests, and the ordinance's actual effect on
speech. 69 If a regulation is determined to be content-based or
66 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (upholding the constitutionality of New York City
noise regulations as applied to the use of the Central Park bandshell after
determining that they were not based upon speech content).
67 Id. at 791. See also Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468
U.S. 288, 295 (1984).
68 See, e.g., Jacobsen v. City of Rapid City, 128 F.3d 660, 663 (8th Cir.
1997) (applying a pretext inquiry in determining that the city's purported interest
in ease of airport maintenance, security and safety was a pretext to ban airport
newsracks); Gerritsen v. City of Los Angeles, 994 F.2d 570, 575 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 915 (1993) (determining that the city's ban on handbill
distribution was a pretext to abridge the free speech rights of a particular citizen,
with whose viewpoint the city did not agree); Young v. New York Transit Auth.,
903 F.2d 146, 148 (2d Cir.) (determining that a ban on panhandling and begging
in the New York City subway system was not enacted as a pretext to abridge
free speech rights), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984 (1990).
69 See generally Globe Newspaper, 100 F.3d at 183-94. After performing
their examination, the Globe Newspaper court found that the application of the
Street Furniture Guidelines resulting in a newsrack ban was "nothing more than
an incidental effect of [the Guideline's] stated aesthetic goal of enhancing the
historic architecture of the District by reducing visual clutter." Id. at 183. Cf.
Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575
(1983) (invalidating an ordinance that, while enactedto regulate empty storefront
merchandise and public safety/welfare structures, economically affectedall forms
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capable of discriminatory application to only certain citizens, 70 it
is subject to strict scrutiny71 by the court, whereas if it is content-
neutral, the court applies an intermediate level of scrutiny.72
Under the intermediate scrutiny analysis, the time, place, and
manner doctrine is used to analyze the restrictions on First
Amendment expression.
of newspaper distribution, discriminated in favor of one class of newspaper
publisher, and was not generally applicable).
70 See Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 582-83 (holding unconstitutional
through a strict scrutiny analysis an ordinance establishing a tax on newsprint
because it applied only to the press and favored one class of publishers over
another and was therefore not generally applicable).
71 See generally City of Lakewoodv. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750,
767-68 (1988) (applying a strict scrutiny analysis in striking a newsrack permit
ordinance because the mayor could use unbridled discretion to limit the
constitutionally protected activity of disseminating newspapers). The Rock
Against Racism Court also noted that "[a] regulation that serves purposes
unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an
incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others." 491 U.S. at 791.
See also supra note 15 (discussing the application of strict scrutiny to content-
based regulations).
72 Under an intermediate scrutiny of aesthetic regulations affecting speech,
courts will apply the test advanced in Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators'Ass 'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983). See Part II.B (discussing the time, place,
and manner test developed in Perry). Recent federal court decisions using inter-
mediate scrutiny have sometimes yielded seemingly incongruous results. For
example, in Globe Newspaper, the Street Furniture Guidelines affecting
newsracks were determined to be content-neutral, although they resulted in a total
ban of newsracks from the Beacon Hill Historic District. 100 F.3d at 183. The
Globe Newspaper decision is, however, consistent with the Supreme Court's
decision in Rock Against Racism because the purpose of the Street Furniture
Guidelines was not to censor the content of newspapers. See infra note 218
(noting the court's language in making this determination). See also Part II.B for
further discussion of the ordinance drafting implications: based on this court's
finding, a broader ban may ironically be more constitutionally permissible than
a narrower one for enacting stricter speech limitations in areas of heightened
aesthetic context.
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B. lime, Place, and Manner73 Aesthetic Regulation in
Public Fora
Traditional public fora74 such as parks, streets, and side-
" Time refers to the specific period or point during which an expressive
event occurs. Place refers to a definite location or site. Manner has several
definitions applicable to aesthetic regulations. It may refer to the actual medium
or method of communication, such as a concert. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
at 784-85 (holding New York City's sound amplification guidelines for outdoor
concerts constitutional). It may refer to the person's expressive conduct while
using a method of communication. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-
Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 289 (1984) (holding regulation forbidding a protest by
the homeless expressed by sleeping in a public park in Washington, D.C.
constitutional). It also refers to the physical character of the medium, such as the
size of newsracks or signs. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507
U.S. 410, 415 (1993) (newsracks); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453
U.S. 490, 502 (1981) (signs).
74 In Perry, the Supreme Court set out three categories of public fora: "tradi-
tional," such as streets, sidewalks and parks; "limited" purpose, referring to
government designated fora opened "for use by the public as a place of
expressive activity"; and "non-public," comprising public property not designated
for public communication. 460 U.S. at 45-48 (holding that a school mail system
is not a limited public forum and that a state may reserve the use of its property
for its intended function, as long as the regulation is reasonable and not intended
to suppress expression). The Court recognized that the standards by which speech
is evaluated "differ depending on the character of the property at issue." Id. at
44. These public fora designations recognize the importance of the place where
the speech occurs in determining the level of constitutional protection. TRIBE,
supra note 11, § 12-24, at 987. In traditional public fora, the government may
enforce time, place, and manner regulations which are "content neutral, []
narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open
ample alternative channels of communication." Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (citations
omitted). In limited purpose fora, the government reasonable time, place, and
manner regulation is permitted. Id. at 46. In non-public fora, in addition to time,
place, and manner regulations, government may also restrict the use of the fora
to its intended function, as long as the restriction is reasonable and not intended
to censor speakers. Id.
The Court has included in the limited purpose category of government
designated fora school property used for after-hours religious meetings, Lamb's
Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 391-93 (1993);
the student center of a state university, Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-69
(1981); a state fairground, Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Conscious-
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walks75 are so historically associated with the exercise of the First
Amendment rights of free speech and freedom of the press that the
Supreme Court has consistently held under the public forum
doctrine that the government cannot constitutionally prohibit or
broadly deny access to public fora in order to exercise these
rights.76 The public forum doctrine states that speech restrictions
should be given greater scrutiny when they take place in areas
traditionally or historically associated with First Amendment
activity, primarily because public fora such as parks, streets and
sidewalks often provide the economically disadvantaged with their
only access to communicative expression.77 Yet a city may
nonetheless regulate aspects of expression in a content-neutral
manner at certain times and in certain locations in order to achieve
legitimate municipal interests. The First Amendment requires that
these regulations satisfy the time, place, and manner doctrine, most
ness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 655 (1981); and a municipal theater, Southeastern
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975). The Court has held as
non-public fora an airport, International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee,
505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992); a public school district's internal mail system, Perry,
460 U.S. at 45-47; a military base, Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976);
and a county jail, Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 48 (1966).
7' The Supreme Court has noted that streets and parks "time out of mind,
have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions." Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515
(1939). See also Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480 (1988); Boos v. Barry, 485
U.S. 312, 318 (1988) (invalidating a statute containing a content-basedrestriction
that banned picket signs criticizing foreign governments on the street and
sidewalks surrounding their embassies); Perry, 460 U.S. at 44. In Frisby, the
Court also specifically determined that the fact that the streets in question in that
case were narrow and of a residential character did not affect their status as
public fora, stating that "[n]o particularized inquiry into the precise nature of a
specific street is necessary; all public streets are held in the public trust and are
properly considered traditional public fora." 487 U.S. at 480.
76 Hague, 307 U.S. at 515. See also supra note 38 (discussing the origins of
the public forum doctrine).
77 TRIBE, supra note 11, § 12-24, at 987. For an example of the inconsis-
tency with which the Court has defined "traditional," see City Council of Los
Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 814 (1984) (determining that
telephone and utility pole crosswires were not a traditional public fora for the
hanging of political signs although they had been used for that purpose in Los
Angeles for more than 50 years).
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clearly stated in Perry Education Ass 'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass 'n.78 In Perry, the Supreme Court stated:
For the State to enforce a content-based exclusion it must
show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling
state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that
end. The State may ... enforce regulations of the time,
place, and manner of expression which are content-neutral,
are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government
interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of
communication.79
These content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations are
enforced through the use of the state's police power.80 They are
typically enacted by municipalities to serve broad goals such as
public safety, health and welfare," and are tailored to the particu-
lar interests of a city.
78 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). See also Clark, 468 U.S. at 293 (holding that
time, place, and manner restrictions are valid even as applied to expressive
conduct protected to some extent by the First Amendment, such as sleeping to
protest the conditions of the homeless); Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 414
(holding that a city may regulate newsracks based upon the legitimate municipal
goal of safety and aesthetics, but must establish a reasonable fit with the means
chosen to achieve those objectives). In cases involving symbolic speech, courts
apply a similar test taken from United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377
(1968). See infra note 118 (describing the O'Brien test). This Note urges that a
synthesis of the Perry and O'Brien tests, as applied in Clark, be used as the
standard by the municipal practitioner to draft aesthetic regulations best able to
withstand challenge.
79 Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (citations omitted).
" Chief Justice Marshall defined police power as "[t]he acknowledgedpower
of a state to regulate its police, its domestic trade, and to govern its own
citizens." Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 208 (1824). In more recent
times, the Court has included in the police power "all the legislative powers
which a state may exercise over its affairs." Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31
(1954). The Berman Court noted that "[a]n attempt to define [the] reach [of the
police power] or trace its outer limits is fruitless ... [because] the definition is
essentially the product of legislative determination addressed to the purposes of
government, purposes neither abstractly nor historically capable of complete
definition." Id. at 32.
. See supra note 10 (listing other municipal interests recognized by the
Supreme Court as capable of sustaining time, place, and manner regulations).
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When legislation seeks to regulate the visual aspects of
communicative activities on public property, courts will consider
the nature of the speech forum, the type of activity affected by the
enacted regulation, and the asserted governmental interests as a
threshold matter in their factual inquiry.82 Courts make this
inquiry because time, place, and manner restrictions ultimately
balance the significant interests of a city on behalf of all its citizens
with an individual's right to engage in expression protected by the
First Amendment. The requirement that alternative channels of
communication be left open provides a safety valve to ensure that
content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions do not have an
effect that censors or bans the speaker's message.
Particularly in traditional public fora, the Supreme Court also
requires that ordinances be drafted with explicit enforcement
standards to guide administrating officials. 83 Because inexplicit
standards allow arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement that may
censor speech or curtail expression, 84 aesthetic regulations are
particularly susceptible to challenge by affected persons or groups
on vagueness or overbreadth grounds. While the time, place, and
manner test forms the framework for judicial inquiry of any
challenged aesthetic regulation," there are a finite number of
82 See generally Clark, 468 U.S. 288.
3 See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969)
(holding that an ordinance allowing the Birmingham City Commission discretion
to refuse a parade permit did not provide narrow, objective, and definite
standards, thereby abridging First Amendment rights).
84 See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757-58
(1988) (noting that only standards limiting the licensor's discretionwill eliminate
the danger of self-censorship, because a newspaper relying on single-issue sales
through newsracks could feel pressure to endorse or refrain from criticizing the
incumbent mayor); Desert Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City of Moreno Valley, 103
F.3d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 1996) (invalidating an inexplicit ordinance regulating
signs and billboards).
85 International Caucus of Labor Comms. v. City of Montgomery, 111 F.3d
1548, 1550 (1 1th Cir. 1997) (upholding an ordinance banning sidewalk tables
used for the purpose of leafleting). The court noted that when the Supreme Court
has not spoken specifically about the requirements for permissible regulation of
a particular type of communicative activity, the court will apply the "usual time,
place and manner test to each situation, as it arises." Id. at 1553.
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specific regulatory elements that exist within that framework.
Courts analyze these emphasized elements individually for
constitutional compliance, because it is through these elements that
legislators will tailor aesthetic regulations to suit municipal
interests."
C. The Emergence of Aesthetics as a Legitimate Municipal
Interest
Before discussing the judicial analysis of challenged aesthetic
regulations, it is important for the practitioner to realize that
aesthetics has emerged as a legitimate municipal interest capable of
independently justifying an aesthetic ordinance. Despite Supreme
Court decisions establishing aesthetics as a legitimate municipal
interest,87 practitioners drafting aesthetic ordinances may inadver-
tently overlook the inclusion of aesthetics as an interest.88
The recognition of aesthetics as a municipal interest that may
be furthered by regulatory means is a relatively recent phenomenon,
sparked by citizen reaction to the urban blight and ugliness caused
86 These emphasized elements and their judicial analysis are examined in
Part II.
8 See, e.g., City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.
789, 817 (1984) (noting that it is "well settled that a state may legitimately
exercise its police powers to advance esthetic values"); Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (noting that the municipal interest of public welfare includes
aesthetics). See infra notes 100-101 and accompanying text for further discussion
of Berman.
88 For example, the New York City Council has drafted several variations
of newsrack regulations. See New York, N.Y., Initiative 590 (July 18, 1995)
(proposing to add N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 19-128.1, regulating newsracks).
However, the City Council failed to include aesthetics as a municipal goal
justifying visual and location restrictions on the newsracks. Due at least in part
to the threatened opposition of affected newspaper publishers, and despite further
hearings, these regulations have yet to be enacted. See Court Backs a City on
News-Box Removal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1996, at A13. Courts are also unlikely
to uphold challenged aesthetic ordinances when testimony is subsequently
provided by a municipal official asserting aesthetics as the sole municipal
interest, in the absence of a textual or factual showing. See E. E. Mazier, Town-
Wide Ban on Neon Signs Without a Nexus to Aesthetic Goal is Impermissible
Stricture, N.J. LAWYER, May 12, 1997, at 26.
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by the rapid and haphazard growth of communities in the latter half
of the nineteenth century.89 The regulation of billboards was an
early focus of garden clubs and other citizen groups who objected
that billboards marred the beauty of the surroundings," thus
prompting municipalities to enact a variety of ordinances regulating
billboard size, location and existence. 9' These early regulations
were struck down by state courts holding that the municipal interest
of aesthetics alone did not justify the use of the police power to
regulate private property.92 Community aesthetic concerns were
also commonly raised in the context of nuisance93 claims between
" The "City Beautiful"movement, whichbegan about 1880, focused citizens
and design professionals on the importance of city planning as a tool to improve
the appearance of cities prior to the enactment of comprehensive zoning and
aestheticregulations. PAUL D. SPREIREGAN, URBAN DESIGN: THE ARCHITECTURE
OF TOWNS AND CITIES 38-39 (1965).
90 ROBERT M. ANDERSON, 1 NEW YORK ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 7.08, at 319 (1984) (discussing the regulation of billboards in New York).
9' Id. § 7.08, at 320.
92 See, e.g., Curran Bill Posting & Distrib. Co. v. City of Denver, 107 P.
261, 265 (Colo. 1910) (recognizing a concern for a citizen's freedom of
expression in the context of billboard regulation); Passaic v. Patterson Bill
Posting, Adver. & Sign Co., 62 A. 267, 268 (N.J. 1905) (holding that an
ordinance regulating the size, height, location, position and material of all fences,
billboards and advertisements, with the effect of using the state police power to
deprive a landowner of the ordinary business use of his property, could not be
justified on aesthetic grounds and must instead be reasonably necessary for the
public safety), overruled in part by State v. Miller, 416 A.2d 821, 824 (N.J.
1980) (holding that a zoning ordinance regulating signs may accommodate
aesthetic concerns). The court opined in Patterson Bill Posting that "[a]esthetic
considerations are a matter of luxury and indulgence rather than of necessity, and
it is necessity alone which justifies the exercise of the police power to take
private property without compensation." 62 A. at 268.
9' Nuisance is defined as an "activity which arises from unreasonable,
unwarranted or unlawful use by a person of his own property, working
obstruction or injury to the right of another, or to the public, and producing such
material annoyance, inconvenience and discomfort that law will presume
resulting damage." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1065 (6th ed. 1991). A nuisance
that affects community aesthetics is "mixed," because it is "both public and
private in its effects, public because it injures many persons or all the commu-
nity, and private in that it also produces special injuries to private rights." Id. at
1066 (citations omitted).
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neighboring landowners. 94 As with billboard regulations, because
of the subjective connotations associated with the word "aes-
thetic,"9' for many years it was difficult to convince judges that
the unsightly use of land could create an actionable nuisance.96
14 Such nuisance claims included aesthetically objectionable uses of land for
business or industrial purposes, but the outcome of the claims varied depending
upon the activity. See, e.g., Powell v. Taylor, 263 S.W.2d 906, 907 (Ark. 1954)
(banning a funeral home from a residential district in order to protect the
aesthetic sensibilities and mental health of neighboring homeowners); Parkersburg
Builders Material Co. v. Barrack, 191 S.E. 368, 371 (W. Va. 1937) (excluding
as a form of nuisance an auto wrecking business not clearly located in a
residential district merely on the grounds of unsightliness). In general, nuisance
law does not provide relief from aesthetic harms. See United States v. County
Bd., 487 F. Supp. 137, 143 (E.D. Va. 1979) (refusing to find aesthetic injury to
be a nuisance where it was alleged that high rise towers to be built on the
Virginia side of the Potomac River across from Washington, D.C. would visually
interfere with the backdrop that Pierre L'Enfant, the city's designer, envisioned
for the monuments).
9' See supra note 3 (defining aesthetic).
96 ANDERSON, supra note 90, § 7.05, at 314 (discussing judicial insistence
in the first half of the twentieth century that unsightliness as the basis for an
aesthetic nuisance claim was not an appropriate matter for the courts). Chief
Judge Cardozo recognized the uncertain legal state surrounding aesthetic
regulations in New York during the early 1930's when he observed:
The organs of smell and hearing, assailed by sounds and odors too
pungent to be borne, have been ever favored of the law, more
conspicuously, it seems, than sight which perhaps is more inured to
what is ugly or disfigured. Even so, the test for all the senses, for sight
as well as smell and hearing, has been the effect of the offensive
practice upon the reasonable man or woman of average sensibilities.
One of the unsettled questions of the law is the extent to which the
concept of nuisance may be enlarged by legislation so as to give
protection to sensibilities that are merely cultural or aesthetic. The
question need not be answered to decide the case at hand.
People v. Rubenfeld, 172 N.E. 485, 486-87 (N.Y. 1930) (citations omitted). In
New York, aesthetics was not upheld as a municipal interest capable of justifying
speech regulation until the case of People v. Stover, 191 N.E.2d 272, 278 (N.Y.),
appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 43 (1963) (upholding a Rye, N.Y. ordinance which
prohibited the erection and maintenance of clotheslines visible from the street).
The ordinance was enacted in reaction to the Stover Family's dissatisfaction with
the amount of their taxes, which they expressed by hanging tattered clothing
across their front yard. Id. at 273. While the prosecutor argued that the
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State courts did allow cities to realize the conjunctive aesthetic
benefits of ordinances enacted to serve more traditional municipal
interests such as safety, health or morals,97 and slowly these cases
were affirmed by the Supreme Court.98 However, it was not until
1954, in Berman v. Parker,99 a case in which the Supreme Court
upheld an urban renewal plan for the District of Columbia, that
aesthetics was determined to be an independently legitimate
municipal interest.100 In Berman, the Supreme Court recognized
for the first time that aesthetics was included within the larger
clotheslines (to say nothing of Mrs. Stover's fluttering undergarments) would
distract motorists and prevent evacuation from the house in case of fire, the court
discounted those interests, and instead upheld the ordinance because it tended to
preserve the residential character of the neighborhood. Id. at 274. The court
noted, "[o]nce it be conceded that aesthetics is a valid subject of legislative
concern, it seems inescapable that reasonable legislation designed to promote that
end is a valid and permissible exercise of the police power." Id. at 275.
Decisions such as Stover were the foundation for a number of Supreme Court
decisions involving aesthetic regulations in the 1980's. See infra note 116 (listing
these Supreme Court cases).
97 See St. Louis Gunning Adver. Co. v. City of St. Louis, 135 S.W. 929, 942
(Mo. 1911) (justifying billboard regulation because billboards are "constant
menaces to the public safety and welfare; they endanger the public health,
promote immorality, [and] constitute hiding places for criminals and classes of
miscreants").
9' For example, in Welch v. Swasey, the Supreme Court upheld two
Massachusetts statutes that established building height regulations in Boston. 214
U.S. 91, 106 (1909). Although the stated legislative interest was to protect the
beauty of the Boston cityscape, the Court sustained the regulations by reasoning
that a building height cap would improve fire safety. Id. at 107. The Court was
unconcerned that the police power was also being used to indirectly further
aesthetic ends, noting "[t]hat in addition to these sufficient facts [establishing that
the municipal interest of public safety would be served], considerations of an
aesthetic nature also entered into the reasons for their passage, would not
invalidate them." Id. at 108. The Court performed no independent fact-finding,
but simply presumed that the issue of fire safety may have entered into the
purpose of the Building Commissioner in refusing to approve a permit for a
building not in conformance with the statute's height requirements. Id. The Court
was careful to note that its decision to uphold the ordinance was justified for
reasons of public safety, not aesthetics. Id. at 107-08.
9' 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
100 Id. at 32.
880
AESTHETIC REGULATIONS
municipal interest of public welfare, noting that "[t]he values
[public welfare] represents are spiritual as well as physical,
aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the
legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as
well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as
carefully patrolled."'0 ' Although Berman did not involve the
regulation of First Amendment freedoms, 2 the decision signaled
the Court's willingness to permit government efforts to beautify
cities.' °3 In response, lower courts began to uphold aesthetic
regulations that had been previously invalidated,104 and legisla-
tures soon began to enact statutes and create administrative agencies
for the purposes of urban renewal and historic preservation. 5
Berman is also significant because the Court deferred to Congress'
determination of the defined public interests justifying the enacted
aesthetic regulation.0 6 The Court noted that it is "the legislature,
'o' Id. at 33.
'02 In Berman, the Court determined that aesthetic concerns, in conjunction
with other municipal interests, justified condemnation of substandard property to
develop "a better balanced, more attractive community" through exercise of
eminent domain under the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 31, 33.
103 See COSTONIS, supra note 4, at 23.
104 See COSTONIS, supra note 4, at 23.
105 See COSTONIS, supra note 4, at 23-25. Berman began a trend among
lawmakers to enact land use controls to serve aesthetics ends, such as the
National Highway BeautificationAct of 1965, 23 U.S.C. §§ 131, 319 (1994), and
incentive zoning (permitting developers to construct larger buildings in return for
providing plazas and other design amenities) to improve the aesthetics of cities.
COSTONIS, supra note 4, at 23-24. Congress also approved the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321,4331-35, 4341-47 (1994),
requiring the filing of environmental impact statements by federal agencies when
constructing dams, financed interstate highways or licensed nuclear plants in
order to identify and mitigate or avoid harms to environmental aesthetics.
COSTONIS, supra note 4, at 25.
106 The Court noted that in the text of the District of Columbia Redevelop-
ment Act of 1945 § 2, 60 Stat. 790 (1951):
Congress made a "legislative determination" that "owing to techno-
logical and sociological changes, obsolete lay-out, and other factors,
conditions existing in the District of Columbia with respect to
substandard housing and blighted areas ... are injurious to the public
health, safety, morals, and welfare; and it is hereby declared to be the
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not the judiciary, [that] is the main guardian of the public needs to
be served by social legislation, whether it be Congress legislating
concerning the District of Columbia or the States legislating
concerning local affairs."' 7
With the Berman decision and those of state courts across the
country,'0 8 the focus of judicial inquiry changed: future examina-
tions of regulations would focus on whether the means employed
to achieve the aesthetic objective were arbitrary or unreason-
able,0 9 instead of verifying the precise legislative objective.
While aesthetics alone was not yet capable of justifying First
Amendment regulation-this would not occur in the Supreme Court
for another thirty years"° aesthetics was finally recognized as
policy of the United States to protect and promote the welfare of the
inhabitants of the seat of the Government by eliminating all such
injurious conditions by employing all means necessary and appropriate
for the purpose."
Berman, 348 U.S. at 28.
107 Id. at 32 (citations omitted).
'08 A similar shift towards recognition of aesthetics as a legitimate municipal
goal occurred in other states during roughly the same period, culminating in the
Berman decision. See, e.g., Sunad, Inc., v. City of Sarasota, 122 So. 2d 611, 614-
15 (Fla. 1960) (holding unconstitutional a sign ordinance that discriminated
between sizes of on-site advertising signs and billboards, but finding aesthetics
to be just cause for sign regulation), overruled in part by City of Lake Wales v.
Lamar Adver. Ass'n, 414 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 1982); State ex rel. Civello v. City
of New Orleans, 97 So. 440, 444-45 (La. 1923) (suggesting in dicta that
previously decided cases upholding billboard regulations could have rested
logically on aesthetic considerations as easily as those of general welfare);
General Outdoor Adver. Co. v. Department of Pub. Works, 193 N.E. 799, 817
(Mass. 1935) (holding that aesthetics is a proper basis for an action in granting
and denying permits for billboard and sign locations), appeal dismissed, 297 U.S.
725 (1936); Best v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 141 A.2d 606, 612-13 (Pa. 1958)
(upholding the ability of municipal officials to enact reasonable zoning
ordinances based upon aesthetics); State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v.
Wieland, 69 N.W.2d 217, 222-23 (Wis.) (upholding an ordinance establishing
building permit issuance standards for compatibility with previously constructed
buildings), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955).
'09 People v. Stover, 191 N.E.2d 272, 275 (N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 375
U.S. 43 (1963).
11 See City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789
(1984) (establishing aesthetics as a municipal goal justifying regulation of
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an independent, if sometimes underutilized or overlooked, munici-
pal interest.
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR JUDICIAL ANALYSIS OF
AESTHETIC REGULATIONS
Despite the mandate of the First Amendment,"' judicial
decisions involving challenged aesthetic regulations invariably
balance the competing rights of the city, the particular local
neighborhood and affected citizens, either explicitly or implic-
itly."2 Legal scholars studying First Amendment topics have
collected and extensively analyzed these cases and the underlying
aesthetic legislation." 3 Other commentators have debated the
permissible limits of aesthetic regulation." 4 Yet actually drafting
political signage). See Part II.A for further discussion of Vincent.
... See supra note 7 (discussing the text of the First Amendment).
112 See Vincent, 466 U.S. at 806-07; Eastern Conn. Citizens Action Group
v. Powers, 723 F.2d 1050, 1055 (2d Cir. 1983).
113 See Debra T. Landis, Annotation, Restriction of Use of Public Parks as
Violating Freedom of Speech or Press Under First Amendment of Federal
Constitution, 82 L. Ed. 2d 958 (1986 & Supp. 1996) (discussing permit
requirements and other restrictions on the use of parks); Dale R. Agathe,
Annotation, Validity and Construction of Statute or Ordinance Protecting
Historical Landmarks, 18 A.L.R.4th 990 (1981 & Supp. 1996) (collecting and
analyzing state and federal cases in which courts have construed the validity of
state statutes or municipal ordinances protecting historic landmarks); Timothy E.
Travers, Annotation, Validity and Construction of State or Local Regulation
Prohibiting Off-Premise Advertising Structures, 81 A.L.R.3d 486 (1977 & Supp.
1997) (collecting and discussing cases in which courts have construed state or
local regulations prohibiting off-premises advertising signs and billboards); L. S.
Groff, Annotation, Authorization, Prohibition, or Regulation by Municipality of
the Sale of Merchandise on Streets or Highways, or Their Use for Such Purpose,
14 A.L.R.3d 896 (1968 & Supp. 1997) (discussing the power of a city to
authorize, regulate or prohibit the sale of merchandise on its streets, sidewalks,
parks, beaches or highways).
114 See Michael A. Pavlick, Note, No News (Rack) Is Good News? The
Constitutionality of a Newsrack Ban, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 451 (1990)
(arguing that a complete newsrackban would survive constitutional scrutiny). But
see Peter Ball, Extra! Extra! Read All About It: First Amendment Problems in
the Regulation of Coin Operated Newspaper Vending Machines, 19 COLuM. J.L.
& SOC. PROBS. 183, 192-93 (1985) (suggesting that total newsrack bans are
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an aesthetic ordinance that is invulnerable to challenge is still
elusive1 5 for many of the subjective reasons that make aesthetics
difficult to define and justify. Consequently, although an aesthetic
regulation may be drafted to avoid challenge, it nonetheless may
still be subjected to challenge.
First Amendment decisions are typically based on a balance
between the municipal interests prompting the regulation of speech,
the means used to regulate the expression, the type of speech
subject to regulation and the place where the speech occurs. 1 6
When the location of the regulated speech is a traditional public
forum, courts apply the time, place, and manner test set forth in
Perry Education Ass'n v Perry Local Educators' Ass'n'17 to
always unconstitutional). Ball's conclusion has been called into question by
recent case decisions. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Beacon Hill Architect-
ural Comm'n, 100 F.3d 175 (1st Cir. 1996) (upholding the constitutionality of
street furniture guidelines effectively banning newsracks from a historic district
in Boston).
.. See supra note 17 (citing selected news articles discussing currently
pending challenges to municipal aesthetic ordinances).
116 See generally GUNTHER, supra note 14, § 12-4, at 1249-53. The most
significant recent cases in which the Supreme Court broadly set the limits of
aesthetic regulations were decided in the mid-1980's. See generally City of
Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988); Clark v. Community
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984); Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984);
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981). These cases were
supplemented by a later decision by the Court involving newsracks in City of
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993). Since 1993, the
Supreme Court has heard First Amendment cases involving public fora
sporadically. See Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S.
753 (1995) (invalidating an ordinance banning the erection of unattended
religious structures on government property); City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S.
43 (1994) (invalidating a city ordinance that banned all residential signs except
those falling into one of ten exemptions, for the principal purpose of minimizing
visual clutter). The Ladue ordinance failed as a time, place, and manner
restriction because the Court determined that handbills and advertisements were
inadequate substitute communication media for the banned signs. 512 U.S. at 56.
17 460 U.S. 37 (1983). See supra Part II.B (outlining the Perry test). The
Court states in Perry that in traditional public fora, content-based restrictions are
presumptively invalid and therefore subject to strict scrutiny. Id. at 45. In
contrast, the Vincent Court applied the test from United States v. O'Brien and
held that an ordinance banning the posting of political signs on street light poles
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perform their initial review of the justification for the aesthetic
ordinance. If the speech occurring in the public forum is symbolic,
the Supreme Court alternatively applies the test outlined in United
States v O'Brien."8
However, because some elements of the Perry and 0 'Brien tests
overlap,'19 in past decisions when speech is combined with a
symbolic element, 20 the Supreme Court has framed its analysis
of the regulation at issue under O'Brien, while still relying heavily
on the Perry time, place, and manner test.12 ' The result is the
citation of the prongs of the Perry test in case opinions, coupled
was constitutional. Vincent, 466 U.S. at 804-05. The difference was the Court's
determination that the light poles were not a traditional public forum, but rather
a limited public forum. Id. at 814. Consequently, even though the ordinance
regulatedpolitical speech, and aesthetics was the justifying municipal interest, the
regulation was constitutional. Id. at 815. See infra note 118 (outlining the prongs
of the O'Brien test).
"8 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (burning of a draft card identified as symbolic
speech, but nonetheless permissibly regulated based on the government interest
of insuring the availability of draft cards during wartime). The Supreme Court
held in O'Brien:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Id. at 377. The intermediate scrutiny of the O'Brien test contains elements of the
public forum time, place, and manner test from Perry. However, the Perry test
is more speech protective because in addition to the prongs of the O'Brien test
a speaker must also have access to an alternative means for communicating his
message. The Court is slightly less protective of speech containing only a
symbolic element, as the O 'Brien test indicates. See generally Harold L. Quadres,
Content-Neutral Public Forum Regulations: The Rise of the Aesthetic State
Interest, the Fall of Judicial Scrutiny, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 439 (1986).
.9 Compare the Perry test, outlined supra Part II.B, with the O'Brien test,
outlined supra note 118.
120 The combination of speech with a symbolic element is often regulated by
aesthetic ordinances. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468
U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (a demonstration with speeches was combined with the
symbolic activity of sleeping overnight in a park).
'2 Vincent, 466 U.S. at 804-05, 808-10.
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with the recognition of the elements of the O'Brien test in the
supporting judicial analysis. 22 Recognizing this tendency, and the
fact that regulation of the means of speech dissemination may
contain both pure speech and symbolic qualities, practitioners
should adopt a synthesis of the two tests as a drafting standard for
their own aesthetic ordinances.
23
To be constitutional under the First Amendment, an aesthetic
regulation should therefore be: (1) content-neutral; (2) drawn to
further an important or substantial governmental interest; that (3)
is within the constitutional power of the Government; (4) be
narrowly tailored to serve that government interest; and (5) leave
open ample alternative channels of communication. Under the
synthesized test, the focus of judicial inquiry often becomes
whether the government is regulating speech or symbolic expres-
sion with the intent to censor because of disagreement with the
content of the message. 2 4 While a city may regulate speech
content only if such a restriction is necessary, and narrowly drawn,
to serve a compelling governmental interest, 25 a content-neutral
aesthetic regulation'26 may be upheld even though it has an
122 See Clark, 468 U.S. at 299 n.8.
123 The Perry/O'Brien synthesized test was applied by the Supreme Court in
Clark. Id. at 298-99. Clark has now come to stand for the proposition that
government may enact content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations
involving symbolic conduct, to some extent replacing O'Brien as the leading
case. Id. at 297-98. Whether a reviewing court cites to Clark or O'Brien, the
elements of the synthesized test are consistently applied. See Capitol Square
Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 769 (1995) (citing Clark, 468
U.S. at 293); Vincent, 466 U.S. at 804-05 (citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377).
124 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
125 In traditional public fora, ordinances proposing to regulate First
Amendment freedoms may be subject to strict scrutiny, whether or not they are
content-based. See supra note 15. However, content-based restrictions are the
most difficult for the government to justify under the Perry test and are
examined most carefully by courts. See supra note 15. Because aesthetic
ordinances are primarily concerned with the regulation of the visual or aural
aspects of communicative expression, they are not typically content-based,
although their application may have that incidental effect. See City of Lakewood
v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 763-64 (1988).
'26 See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293
(1984). Individual Justices have even suggested that an outright ban on certain
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incidental restraining effect on speech, if it serves a legitimate or
significant municipal interest unrelated to the speech content. 27
Although aesthetics is considered to be a significant interest, 28
it has never been judged by the Supreme Court to be a compelling
interest. The application of the synthesized test therefore suggests
that practitioners and government officials ensure that their policies
reflect valid governmental interests such as public safety, welfare
types of expression may be constitutional, although the Supreme Court has not
yet decided the constitutionality of a ban on newsracks. Justice White's dissent
in Plain Dealer stated "[t]he Court quite properly does not establish any constitu-
tional right of newspaper publishers to place newsracks on municipal property.
The Court expressly declines to 'pass' on the question of the constitutionality of
an outright municipal ban on newsracks. . . . [C]ities remain free ... to enact
such bans." 486 U.S. 750, 773 (1988). See also Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 761
(recognizing that the government can ban from a government-owned public
forum all unattended displays if it so desired) (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at
802-03 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (same); Vincent, 466 U.S. at 810-11 (noting that
an aesthetic interest in banning signs on public property is not compromised by
not extending the ban to private property, since alternative means are preserved
for disseminating the speech message). The potential for a municipality to enact
bans on expressive activities is discussed more fully in Part II.B.
127 See Clark, 468 U.S. at 293. A regulation is not content-based simply
because an official reviewing the proposed expression must make a determination
of whether an activity is in violation of the ordinance. See Globe Newspaper Co.
v. Beacon Hill Architectural Comm'n, 100 F.3d 175, 183 (1st Cir. 1996). Courts
have upheld ordinances as content-neutral even though an official was required
to make this determination, as long as the ordinance provides explicit standards
by which the determination can be made. Id.
128 Activities benefitted by aesthetics, such as the promotion of tourism,
economic growth and preservation of property are also significant governmental
interests. See New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 304 (1976). The protection
of residential privacy, sometimes used as a justification for aesthetic regulations,
has also been determined by the Supreme Court as a significant government
interest. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988).
887
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
and aesthetics, and not community prejudice,'29 or impermissible
motives leading to censorship of speech content. 3 '
After the determination of content-neutrality, the reviewing
court examines whether the particular time, place, and manner
regulation is narrowly tailored to achieve the stated significant
municipal interest. In Ward v Rock Against Racism,' the
Supreme Court established that an ordinance is valid if it does not
burden "substantially more speech than is necessary to further the
government's legitimate interests."'3 The Court has also determined
that the overall municipal context impacted by the ordinance must
be taken into consideration, and so requires that an enacted
regulation have "more than a negligible impact on aesthetics."'33
129 See Gerritsen v. City of Los Angeles, 994 F.2d 570, 578 (9th Cir.)
(holding an ordinance prohibiting handbill distribution in certain portions of a
historic district unconstitutional because its permit scheme targeted the political
activities of a single individual who was disseminating speech with which the
city disagreed), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 915 (1993).
130 See Cleveland Area Bd. of Realtors v. City of Euclid, 88 F.3d 382, 385
(6th Cir. 1996) (upholding the district court's decision that although a sign
ordinance's "principal justification" was aesthetics, the city's actual motivation
was to "'curtail[] the negative messages that are often associated with the
proliferation of real estate signs in neighborhoods"') (citation omitted).
133 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
132 Id. at 799. This determination abandoned the "least restrictive means" test
previously in effect for assessing time, place, and manner regulations. In Rock
Against Racism, the Court stated:
[T]he regulation will not be invalid simply because a court concludes
that the government's interest could be adequately served by some less-
speech-restrictive alternative. "The validity of [time, place, or manner]
regulations does not turn on a judge's agreement with the responsible
decisionmaker concerning the most appropriate method for promoting
significant government interests" or the degree to which those interests
should be promoted.
Id. at 800 (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)). The
"least restrictive means" test has also been rejected for judging restrictions on
commercial speech. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S.
410, 418 n. 13 (1993). The Court does examine whether the manner of restriction
is the least severe in analyzing the "fit" between the government's asserted
interest and the means chosen to achieve them. Id. at 416 n. 12 (relying on Board
of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)).
133 Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 531 (1981).
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Such a showing generally requires that the government be engaged
in a "comprehensive coordinated effort"'13 4 to address the aesthetic
concerns of the city or affected community.
Finally, the reviewing court examines whether the means of
regulation leaves open ample alternative channels for the communi-
cation of the speech message. This factual inquiry is made by the
court based upon the application of the ordinance to the particular
First Amendment activity and circumstances of the case.'35
Because the Supreme Court has held that a municipality may
sometimes restrict speech when necessary to advance significant
government interests,'36 it has in essence created a reasonableness
standard for determining whether ample alternative channels exist.
If reasonable alternative channels exist, a court should uphold a
municipal ordinance that forecloses a particular method of
disseminating speech,'37 or a ban applicable to certain areas of a
city
38
Many courts utilize a similar legal framework in their time,
place, and manner analysis of aesthetic ordinances that regulate
First Amendment activities. Within this framework courts consis-
tently emphasize a finite set of elements, and examine the relation-
134 Id. This requirement is similar to the "direct advancement" element of the
test for First Amendment protection of commercial speech advanced in Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557, 564-
66 (1980). See infra note 153 (outlining the elements of the Central Hudson
test).
135 See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Beacon Hill Architectural Comm'n, 100
F.3d 175, 192-94 (1st Cir. 1996). Because the ordinance at issue in Globe
Newspaper affected only newsracks and other street furniture in an aesthetically
sensitive historic district, the Court analyzed the available means of newspaper
distribution and found that other means, such as vendors, were a more
historically appropriate alternative. Id. at 189.
136 City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804
(1984).
117 Id. at 803-04.
138 See Globe Newspaper, 100 F.3d at 178 (ordinance banning newsracks
applicable only to Boston's Beacon Hill Historic District); Sciarrino v. City of
Key West, 83 F.3d 364, 366 (1 1th Cir. 1996) (regulation of handbills applicable
only in the city's historic district); Gerritsen v. City of Los Angeles, 994 F.2d
570, 573 (9th Cir. 1993) (ordinance regulating handbill distribution applicable
only to historic El Pueblo Park section of the city).
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ship between municipal interests and permissible means for
achieving them, delegation of enforcement discretion, permit
procedures, and insurance requirements. 139 The municipal and
citizen interests encompassed within these elements are weighed by
the courts in their determination of whether a communicative
activity will be protected from regulation in a given situation. Part
II.A focuses on these emphasized textual elements in cases where
specific aesthetic ordinances were constitutionally challenged on
vagueness or overbreadth grounds. Part II.B presents a special
examination of current cases in areas of heightened aesthetic
concern and discusses the implications of these decisions on the
drafting of regulations applicable to these special contexts.
A. The Emphasized Elements: Municipal Interests and
Permissible Means, Enforcement Delegation and Permit
Procedures, and Insurance Requirements
Vagueness and overbreadth challenges to content-neutral
aesthetic regulations involve the constitutionality of restraints on the
visual aspects of communicative expression through time, place,
and manner regulations. 140 Using the legal framework of the
synthesized Perry/O 'Brien test, judicial decisions on the merits of
these challenges focus on a specific set of emphasized elements.
"' See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417-18
(1993) (analyzing the fit between municipal goals and the means chosen to
achieve them); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791-92 (1989)
(examining the enacted ordinance for content-neutrality); City of Lakewood v.
Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 769-70 (1988) (examining whether an
ordinance provides for non-discriminatory enforcement); Vincent, 466 U.S. at
805 (discussing the justification for the asserted municipal goals); Clark v.
Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295 (1984) (upholding an
ordinance that banned the expressive activity of sleeping in a protest in a national
park in Washington, D.C., after verifying the existence of alternative means for
communication of the intended message); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,
453 U.S. 490, 511-12 (1981) (distinguishing between permissible regulation
favoring on-site commercial advertising over off-site commercialadvertising, and
impermissible regulation favoring on-site commercial over non-commercial
speech).
14o See Plain Dealer, 486 U.S. at 756.
890
AESTHETIC REGULATIONS
These elements are examined even when the challenge is not based
upon vagueness or overbreadth.14' These elements create an
interface between the factual circumstances of the case and
constitutional theory and are used by the reviewing court to balance
the rights of the city, the local community and citizens. The
emphasized elements are the relationship between the stated
municipal interests and the means chosen to achieve them; 142 the
delegation of decision-making discretion to regulation enforcement
officials; 143 and the procedural and substantive permit and insur-
ance requirements for approval to engage in the regulated commu-
nicative conduct. 144 Although not every challenged ordinance will
contain each element, the municipal practitioner should consider
14l See generally Globe Newspaper, 100 F.3d at 182-94 (examining the
emphasized elements in analyzing a challenge to an ordinance that established
street furniture guidelines for Boston on the grounds that the guidelines
impermissibly infringed on distribution rights of newspaper publishers under the
First Amendment).
142 See Messer v. City of Douglasville, 975 F.2d 1505, 1508 (11th Cir.
1992).
'"3 See Plain Dealer, 486 U.S. at 772 (determining that the lack of express
standards in a newsrack ordinance allowed the Mayor to set additional conditions
or deny permit applications with unlimited discretion); Desert Outdoor Adver.,
Inc. v. City of Moreno Valley, 103 F.3d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 1996) (invalidating
an ordinance conditioning a permit to erect a sign or billboard on findings by
city officials that the billboards or signs "will not have a harmful effect upon the
health or welfare of the general public and will not be detrimental to the welfare
of the general public and will not be detrimental to the aesthetic quality of the
community or the surrounding land uses"); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. City of
Hallandale, 734 F.2d 666, 673-74 (1 th Cir. 1984) (holding that the conditioning
of a license to vend newspapers on compliance with "applicable ordinances" to
be determined at the discretion of the city clerk creates an unconstitutionally
broad censorial power).
'" See Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc. v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth.,
745 F.2d 767, 772 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding MTA newsrack licensing fee
constitutional as a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction narrowly
tailored to serve the significant government interest of raising revenue for the
efficient, self-sufficient operation of the rail lines); Miami Herald, 734 F.2d at
674 (determining that a newsrack ordinance that conditioned a license to install
newsracks on "unspecified conditions precedent" granted city officials the
opportunity to discriminatorily deny licenses and therefore was not a narrowly
drawn time, place, and manner regulation).
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how the precise drafting of each element will add to the clarity and
specificity of the ordinance as a whole.
Cities have enacted ordinances or formulated policy regulating
such varied expressive activity as parades,'45 picketing,'46 pro-
tests and demonstrations,147 leafleting tables, 48 street sales of
art, 149 impromptu sidewalk and park performances of music,1
50
and organized concerts.' Yet the majority of recent cases have
concerned vagueness and overbreadth challenges to ordinances
regulating newsracks on city sidewalks' 2 and signs of various
types."5 ' Because newsracks, signs and billboards are semi-perma-
141 See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 148 (1969).
146 See Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 616-17 (1968).
141 See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 290-
91(1984).
141 See International Caucus of Labor Comms. v. City of Montgomery, 111
F.3d 1548, 1549 (1 lth Cir. 1997); International Caucus of Labor Comms. v. City
of Chicago, 816 F.2d 337, 339 (7th Cir. 1987); International Caucus of Labor
Comms. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 724 F. Supp. 917, 920 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
149 See Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 691 (2d Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 2408 (1997).
5o See Turley v. New York City Police Dep't, No. 93 Civ. 8748 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 4, 1996), injunction granted, No. 93 Civ. 8748 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 1997).
' See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 793-94 (1989).
152 See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 415
(1993); City of Lakewoodv. Plain DealerPubl'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 755 (1988).
"' See City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,
816-17 (1984) (upholding an ordinance regulating political campaign signs based
upon the city's aesthetic interest in avoiding visual clutter); Metromedia, Inc. v.
City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 512-13 (1981) (invalidating an ordinance
banning the erection of outdoor advertising displays, such as billboards, carrying
non-commercial messages and commercial advertising for goods located off-site).
The Metromedia Court held that a city may selectively regulate types of
commercial speech, but may not do the same with non-commercial speech. 453
U.S. at 506, 513.
The Supreme Court distinguishes between commercial speech and non-
commercial speech, holding that while commercial speech may be regulatedmore
broadly than non-commercial speech, it is still protected from unwarranted
government regulation by the First Amendment. Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980). The Central
Hudson Court adopted a specific test for evaluating the constitutionality of
regulations involving commercial speech as distinguished from more fully
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nent structures, their impact on the aesthetics of a community can
be particularly noticeable. Consequently, they are often the focus
of aesthetic regulations seeking to ameliorate their visual impact,
and reviewing courts are generally sympathetic to the city's
regulatory interest. 54 The reaction of courts to municipal regula-
tion of more transient forms of speech dissemination, such as
leafleting, picketing and demonstrations is less sympathetic. 55
Courts may support the First Amendment rights of a citizen
speaking for a limited time more favorably, 5 6 leaving the city
protected non-commercial speech. Id. at 5 63-66. The Court held that commercial
speech is protected under the First Amendment if the speech concerns lawful
activity and is not misleading. Id. at 563. However, government must assert a
substantial interest served by the commercial speech restrictions. Id. at 564.
Commercial speech restrictions are then valid only if the regulations seek to
implement a substantial government interest, directly advance that interest, and
reach no further than is necessary to accomplish the given objective. Id. See
Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 427-31 (holding unconstitutional an ordinance
banning newsracks carrying commercial advertisements but permitting those
carrying newspapers). When the aesthetic regulation affects both types of speech,
it may be evaluated using the heightened scrutiny applied to non-commercial
speech. See Southlake Property Assoc. v. City of Morrow, 112 F.3d 1114, 1116-
17 (1 lth Cir. 1997) (applying a heightened level of scrutiny to a sign ordinance
affecting both commercial and non-commercial speech, yet finding the ordinance
constitutional because the court determined that it did not reach non-commercial
speech and permissibly regulated commercial speech).
154 See Vincent, 466 U.S. at 805; Globe Newspaper Co. v. Beacon Hill
Architectural Comm'n, 100 F.3d 175, 183 (1st Cir. 1996); Messer v. City of
Douglasville, 975 F.2d 1505, 1510-11 (11th Cir. 1992).
155 See Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 162, 164 (1939) (justifying
the burden imposed on municipalities to clean the streets of litter as an indirect
consequence of the constitutional protection of the freedom of speech and press).
But see Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88-89 (1949) ("That more people may
be more easily and cheaply reached by sound trucks... is not enough to call
forth constitutional protection for what those charged with public welfare
reasonably think is a nuisance when easy means of publicity are open.").
156 In Schneider, the Supreme Court invalidated an ordinance banning
handbill distribution on public streets, although the ban was the city's most
effective means of serving the substantial municipal interest in minimizing litter
and traffic congestion. 308 U.S. at 162. The Court determined that punishing
those who actually litter interfered less with First Amendment rights, although
the city suffered the aesthetic detriment of litter. Id.
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and other citizens to accept any aesthetic detriment. The predomi-
nance of challenges to newsrack and sign regulations may also
reflect the financial ability of newspaper publishers and advertisers
to mount these challenges, rather than being truly representative of
all viable challenges that may be made to aesthetic ordinances.'57
Despite the diverse types of expressive speech, the emphasized
elements recur in varying combinations in virtually all cases. The
impact of the emphasized elements on vagueness and overbreadth
challenges are individually discussed below.
1. Municipal Interests and Permissible Means
Challenges to aesthetic ordinances are either based on a failure
to connect the means of regulation with the stated municipal
interest or an assertion that aesthetics alone cannot justify First
Amendment regulation in the particular public fora at issue. The
leading contemporary Supreme Court decision recognizing the
validity of aesthetic regulation is City Council of Los Angeles v
Taxpayers for Vincent, 5 ' in which the Court determined that
municipal interests such as aesthetics could outweigh concerns over
curtailing freedom of speech under certain circumstances.159 In
Vincent, Los Angeles enacted a ban on all signs on designated
public property and fixtures, thereby prohibiting a political
campaign committee from posting candidate signs on city utility
157 There is also the converse concern: that a newspaper or other group
wishing to engage in expression in a public fora will be a target of a permit
denial and will not have the time or economic means to mount a challenge. This
was anticipated in Plain Dealer, leading the Court to require that an ordinance
provide explicit standards for the granting of a permit. 486 U.S. at 758. For a
more recent example, see Caitlin Francke, For-Sale Sign Case is Won in Court;
Judge Says Law on Cars Parked Along Roads is Unconstitutional, BALTIMORE
SuN, Nov. 22, 1996, at lB (involving a pro se case in which a citizen appealed,
at his own expense, two $24 parking tickets written because his car had an illegal
for sale sign in the window).
466 U.S. 789 (1984).
'5 Id. at 805. In Vincent, the Court found that aesthetic interests in avoiding
"visual clutter" were sufficiently substantial to justify a content-neutral
prohibition against political signs on public property. Id.
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poles and crosswires. 6° Applying a reasonableness test1 61 to the
content-neutral ordinance, the Court determined that the utility
poles were not public fora, and that such a regulation could stand
when it does not seek to prohibit particular viewpoints and is
reasonable in a "common sense" way. 62 The Court also held that
the regulation need not be the most reasonable solution avail-
able, 16' and most significantly, noted that simply because govern-
ment property can be used for expressive activity does not imply
a constitutional requirement that such uses be permitted.' 64 The
ruling in this case suggests that clearly stating aesthetics as a
municipal goal provides additional latitude for city officials to enact
time, place, and manner regulations affecting visual aspects of the
speech medium, even when the content is political. 65 Aesthetics
may also be used in conjunction with other historically recognized
160 Id. at 792.
161 The Vincent Court adapted the reasonableness test from Perry, stating
that:
Public property which is not by tradition or designation a forum for
public communication may be reserved by the State "for its intended
purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on
speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely
because public officials oppose the speaker's view."
Id. at 814-15 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37, 46 (1983)). Cf City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S.
410, 417 (1993) (applying an additional "reasonable fit" test between municipal
means and ends). The ordinance at issue failed, however, because the ban
affected only a small percentage of newsracks in the city, the ordinance did not
clearly distinguish between commercial and non-commercial publications, and
because a ban limited to commercial messages did not have a direct relationship
to the stated municipal interest of aesthetics. Id. at 429-30. The ordinance was
therefore found not to be content-neutral. Id.
162 Vincent, 466 U.S. at 815.
163 Id. at 810-12.
164 Id. at 814 (emphasis added).
165 Political speech is traditionally entitled to the fullest possible constitu-
tional protection under the First Amendment, and the posting of signs is a
historic means of communicating a broad range of political ideas and informa-
tion. Id. at 819 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that subjective aesthetic
municipal interests are an insufficient justification to abridge political speech
carried on posted signs).
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municipal interests carefully chosen to focus on the detrimental
effects of the First Amendment expression that the city seeks to
regulate. 166
The issue of whether the text of an aesthetic ordinance must
present detailed evidence establishing the validity of the enacted
municipal interests has been addressed differently in court deci-
sions.167 When the Supreme Court determines that an advanced
regulatory scheme is self-evidently destined to succeed or fail, it
passes on the constitutionality without an extensive examination of
the evidence.1 68 Yet when the decision is not self-evident, the
166 In Messer v. City of Douglasville, in which an ordinance regulating signs
in the city's historic district was upheld, the ordinance text expressed the city's
interest in aesthetics and other conjunctive interests as follows:
In order to protect the public safety, to assure compatibility of
signs with surrounding land uses, to enhance the business and economy
of the City of Douglasville, to protect the public investment in the
streets and highways, to maintain the tranquil environment of
residential areas, to promote industry and commerce, to provide an
aesthetically appealing environment, and to provide for the orderly and
reasonable display of advertising for the benefit of all its citizens, the
city council of Douglasville, Georgia, hereby determines that the public
health, safety, and welfare, and to eliminate visual clutter and blight,
require adoption of this chapter.
975 F.2d 1505, 1514 n.8 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing CITY OF DOUGLASVILLE, GA.
CODE § 26-1 (1989)).
167 For instance, in International Caucus of Labor Committees v. City of
Montgomery, the court stated that a city is "'entitled to advance its interests by
arguments based on appeals to common sense and logic."' 111 F.3d 1548, 1551
(lth Cir. 1997) (quoting Multimedia Publ'g Co. v. Greenville-Spartanburg
Airport, 991 F.2d 154, 160 (4th Cir. 1993)). Although such arguments may be
acceptable to courts, it may behoove municipal practitioners to consider witness
testimony or graphic and photographic presentations to buttress the city's
municipal interest justification for enacting an ordinance. See Sciarrino v. City
of Key West, 83 F.3d 364, 367-68 (1 1th Cir. 1996) (presenting witness testimony
of harassment and a videotape illustrating litter problems associated with the use
of "barkers" to distribute business handbills as evidence of the city's justification
for enacting an off-premises canvassing ordinance).
168 Compare Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico,
478 U.S. 328, 343-44 (1986) (determining on the face of a gambling advertise-
ment regulatory scheme intended to reduce the demand for casino gambling, thus
protecting the health, safety, and welfare of the residents of Puerto Rico, that it
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Court requires that the government present solid evidence that the
regulation will have the intended effect, 169 and credits the city's
stated interests when this type of evidence is included in the
ordinance's preamble or text.170 Because the evidence presenta-
tion requirement is at the discretion of the reviewing court, the
practitioner should include evidence in the text of any enacted
aesthetic regulation establishing how the regulatory means will
further the city's asserted interest.
71
Once the legitimate municipal interest is established as
significant under the factual circumstances and record, the court
continues its inquiry by determining whether the regulation is
narrowly tailored to serve the established interest. This narrow
tailoring appears in the specific regulation standards, and the
element of enforcement delegation and permit procedures.
will be successful), with Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 541 (1995)
(determining on the face of a regulatory scheme to ban disclosure of beer alcohol
content on labels that it will not be successful in furthering the asserted
government interest of suppressing the threat of "strength wars" among brewers
in a "direct and material way").
169 Compare Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 626 (1995)
(validating regulation based upon presented statistical analysis and anecdotal
data), with Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1993) (holding that the
government had not established the material advancement of an interest where
no studies were presented showing the likely success of the regulation and where
the record "does not disclose any anecdotal evidence" to validate governmental
assertions of the regulation's effectiveness).
170 The Supreme Court has noted that the direct advancement of a single
substantial governmental interest is sufficient to prevent the invalidation of the
regulation, when buttressed by solid evidence. See Went For It, 515 U.S. at 625
n. 1.
171 Some states require that a municipality articulate a tangible, specific
objective in order to restrict signs. See Mazier, supra note 88, at 26. For
example, New Jersey requires evidence that a ban on signs relates to stated
municipal interests of aesthetics and property values and a factual basis for a
particular regulatory scheme. See State v. Calabria, 693 A.2d 949 (N.J. Super Ct.
Law Div. 1997).
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2. Enforcement Delegation and Permit Procedures
Municipalities seeking to regulate communicative activities
through time, place, and manner regulations can potentially screen
these expressive activities through permit and fee procedures. 72
Although the government may constitutionally impose a content-
neutral regulation of expression, it may not condition approval to
engage in that expression on obtaining a permit or license from an
official who may exercise boundless discretion. 73
In City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co.,74 the
Supreme Court held that a constitutionally acceptable ordinance
must establish content-neutral standards not subject to application
by "the unbridled discretion of a municipal official," to insure that
the licensing decision is not based on speech content.'75 In Plain
Dealer, the enacted ordinance allowed the mayor complete
discretion to grant or deny a newsrack application without
providing any neutral criteria on which to base the decision.176
172 See Gerritsen v. City of Los Angeles, 994 F.2d 570, 575 (9th Cir.)
(holding that a city ordinance requiring a permit for handbill distribution in a
historic park unconstitutional because the requirement was intended to discourage
protest activities), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 915 (1993).
' Courts use the prior restraint doctrine to hold such laws invalid on their
face. See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 770 n. 11
(1988). The prior restraint doctrine, like the overbreadthand vagueness doctrines,
is based on the means used to restrict speech or expression, and whether such a
restriction impermissibly censures. GUNTHER, supra note 14, § 12-1, at 1203.
174 486 U.S. 750 (1988).
... Id. at 760. Typically a court will examine the ordinance and search for
specifically enumerated factors to be considered by the licensing official in
making the licensing decision. Id.
176 Id. Section 901.181, Codified Ordinances, City of Lakewood, provided:
"The Mayor shall either deny the application [for a permit], stating the reasons
for such denial or grant said permit subject to the following terms .. " Section
901.181(c) sets out some of the terms for approval of a requested permit,
including: "(7) such other terms and conditions deemed necessary and reasonable
by the Mayor." Id. at 769. The Court determined from this textual language that
the ordinance facially contained no limits on the mayor's discretion. Id. The
Plain Dealer majority and dissent agreed, however, that the Court was not
passing on the constitutionality of outright bans on newsracks for aesthetic or
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The Court required that the city make explicit in its law, either by
textual incorporation, binding judicial or administrative construc-
tion, or well-established practice, the health, safety or welfare
reasons that would allow permit approval or rejection.'77 The
Court also required that any future additional conditions be
imposed only when based upon narrowly-drawn content-neutral
standards..17
As noted in Part II, merely creating a permit procedure as part
of an aesthetic regulation does not automatically make that
regulation's review procedure content-based. 79 However, a
court's concern in analyzing fee and permit procedures is whether
an enforcement official may act in a way that creates impermissible
censorship of expression through the arbitrary denial of a per-
mit. 8 0 Courts therefore require that an ordinance limit the offi-
cial's discretion by providing clear and explicit standards for permit
approval.' These standards must be explicit enough to guide the
licensing official and additionally should allow courts to determine
easily whether the official is engaging in censorship.18 2 The
examination centers on whether the ordinance sets forth the entire
set of regulations, or if it is enabling legislation, whether it sets out
explicit standards for the administrative agency that will promulgate
other reasons, but rather that the ordinance at issue was unconstitutional because
of the impermissible discretion granted to licensing officials in the permit
process. Id. at 762 n.7, 773 (White, J., dissenting).
177 Id. at 770.
178 Id. at 769-70.
179 Seesupra note 127 (discussing judicial determination of the content-basis
of aesthetic regulation).
1"0 See Plain Dealer, 486 U.S. at 757. The Court anticipated the possibility
that "a newspaper that relies to a substantial degree on single issue sales [through
a newsrack could] fee[l] significant pressure to endorse the incumbent mayor in
an upcoming election, or to refrain from criticizing him, in order to receive a
favorable and speedy disposition on its permit application." Id. at 757-58.
IS! Id. The Court is typically less concerned with ordinances that are not
aimed at expressive conduct, such as building department permit procedures,
because these laws are rarely used for the purpose of censorship. Id. at 760-61.
112 Id. at 757-58. The concern is that without these licensing standards,
officials will later engage in rationalizations and arbitrary criteria for permit
approval. Id.
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the final regulations. Courts are wary of legislation that acts as an
inexplicit guideline that delegates policy matters to police, licensing
officials, judges or juries for subjective resolution.'83 Inexplicit
standards in a licensing ordinance may be challenged facially
without first applying for the license, 84 and an associated chal-
lenge may be based on the availability of judicial review of
decisions made by licensing officials. 185 Although judicial review
does not replace explicit standards, the concern, particularly in
cases where the permit application involves a particular event or
time, is that the absence of review will contribute to speech
censorship. 8 6 The permit process is also examined to determine
whether it exists purely as a revenue raising measure, 87 or
whether the amount of the fee is so prohibitively expensive that it
has the effect of censoring the expression. 88 To avoid these
challenges, the practitioner must draft the ordinance so as to
' Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972). These standards
may exist in another previously enacted statute or ordinance, and if so, will not
require repeating in the aesthetic ordinance. See Outdoor Communications, Inc.
v. City of Murfreesboro, No. 94-5406, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 16544, at *11
(6th Cir. June 30, 1995) (unpublished table decision).
184 Justice Brennan's majority opinion for the Court noted: "[A] facial
challenge lies whenever a licensing law gives a government official or agency
substantial power to discriminate based upon the content or viewpoint of speech
by suppressing disfavored speech or disliked speakers." Plain Dealer, 486 U.S.
at 759.
185 Id. at 771.
186 Id.
187 See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. City of Hallandale, 734 F.2d 666, 670-
71 (1 th Cir. 1984).
188 See Outdoor Communications, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 16544, at *6
(holding that the fee requirements of a sign ordinance consisting of a one-time
charge of ten dollars plus fifty cents per square foot of proposed sign was not
prohibitively expensive and did not effectively ban signs because the ordinance
contained an economic hardship appeal provision). Courts have held that a city
may charge permit fees to engage in expressive activities in public fora, but the
amount of the fee may not exceed that required to defray administrative costs.
National Awareness Found. v. Abrams, 50 F.3d 1159, 1165 (2d Cir. 1995);
Eastern Conn. Citizens Action Group v. Powers, 723 F.2d 1050, 1056 (2d Cir.
1983). The Supreme Court has upheld the use of a sliding scale fee for First
Amendment activities. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576-77 (1941).
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include timely judicial review,189 and must provide standards for
the approval or denial of variances.' 90
3. Insurance Requirements
Municipalities may desire that a person or organization wishing
to engage in expressive conduct agree to indemnify9 ' the city
against any liability arising out of the use of public property for
communicative purposes. This is typically provided for in the
ordinance text by requiring that the person or group supply the city
with a liability insurance policy covering the proposed activity.' 92
Regulations of this type may produce a vagueness and overbreadth
challenge by affected individuals who assert that the city's
insurance requirements are merely a pretext for censorship. 93
"9 Plain Dealer, 486 U.S. at 771.
'90 See Outdoor Communications, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 16544, at *10-11
(providing variance criteria for the approval of exterior signs). A challenge by
an economically disadvantaged party may be blunted by including an ordinance
provision that allows an economic hardship variance. For example, in Plain
Dealer, the Court noted their concern with permit standards that would allow
courts to differentiate between a legitimate permit denial and one that was based
on an abuse of censorial power caused by the unfettered discretion of a licensing
official. 486 U.S. at 758. The Court illustrated this concern by noting that a
"newspaper espousing an unpopular viewpoint on a shoestring budget may be the
likely target for a retaliatory permit denial [capitalizing on the officials unfettered
discretion], but may not have the time or financial means to challenge the
licensor's action." Id. The Court's analysis suggests not only the necessity that
practitioners provide textual standards that limit the licensor's discretion, but also
the usefulness of including an economic variance procedure to address the
censorship concerns of courts.
'91 Indemnification "restore[s] the victim of a loss, in whole or in part, by
payment, repair, or replacement."BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 93, at
769.
92 See Plain Dealer, 486 U.S. at 754. The liability insurance policy may be
of a short or long term duration depending on whether the proposed activity is
semi-permanent, such as the installation of newsracks, or temporary, such as a
parade or leafleting.
193 Id. at 755 (holding unconstitutional a municipal ordinance requirement
that publishers wishing to display newsracks on public streets indemnify the city
for all liability and obtain property damage insurance in the amount of $100,000,
naming the city as an additional insured).
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Censorship concerns regarding the discretion of the enforcing
official to set the amount of the insurance are similar to the
concerns surrounding the process of permit approval.194 The
Supreme Court has not definitively answered whether these
insurance and indemnity requirements are facially unconstitu-
tional. 195
In Eastern Connecticut Citizens Action Group v Powers,
96
the Second Circuit noted that insurance requirements may be a
special threat to certain controversial groups because under-
writers 97 often consider factors such as political beliefs and the
likelihood of adverse publicity in deciding whether to accept or
reject applications for insurance coverage. 198 The Powers court
did recommend a standard of "careful scrutiny" for fee and
insurance provisions touching on areas of First Amendment
expression and added that officials attempting to impose insurance
requirements should be prepared to justify the amount of coverage
required. 199
Even if the amount of required insurance coverage may be
legitimately justified by a city, the question of whether the city or
'94 See supra note 190 (discussing judicial concerns that high fee require-
ments may censor the speech of economically disadvantaged persons).
' The Supreme Court did not reach the issue of the constitutionality of the
enacted insurance requirements that was presented in Plain Dealer because the
ordinance was invalidated on the grounds that it allowed the Mayor unbridled
discretion in approving permits. 486 U.S. at 772. However, the lower court in
Plain Dealer found the ordinance's insurance requirements unconstitutional
because the city did not require insurance of all permittees who desired to use
public property. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co. v. City of Lakewood, 794 F.2d 1139,
1147 (6th Cir. 1986). The Court has not yet decided this issue.
196 723 F.2d 1050 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding an insurance requirement applied
to a citizen's group desiring to protest on public property unconstitutional as
applied to that particular group, although not unconstitutional per se).
197 An insurance underwriter is the party assuming the risk in return for the
payment of a premium. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 93, at 1527.
' Powers, 723 F.2d at 1056 n.2 (referring to the finding of the trial court).
199 Id. at 1057. In Collin v. O'Malley, a requirement that representatives of
the National Socialist [Nazi] Party of America obtain a $100,000/$300,000
liability policy and a $50,000 property damage policy as a condition for a
demonstration permit was invalidated as an unreasonable restraint on their First
Amendment rights. 452 F. Supp. 577, 578-79 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
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the group wishing to exercise First Amendment rights should pay
for this insurance may also be raised.200 Because insurance
coverage for tort liability continues to rise, neither groups nor the
city may be able to afford insurance coverage. 20 1 Even justifiable
insurance requirements may act to "chill" the expression of free
speech, if expression by impoverished persons or groups is
effectively prevented as a result of their imposition.20 2 Therefore,
insurance requirements must be narrowly tailored to be no more
restrictive than necessary for the city to protect its property
interests.
B. Regulation in Heightened Aesthetic Contexts
Municipalities often wish to enact more limiting aesthetic
regulations in areas of heightened aesthetic concern such as historic
districts2 3 and parks2 4 in order to protect the unique character
of these gettings. These regulations may concern the limitation of
200 Powers, 723 F.2d at 1052-53.
201 See generally Thomas W. Rynard, The Local Government as Insured or
Insurer: Some New Risk Management Alternatives, 20 URB. LAW. 103 (1988)
(discussing the tort insurance crisis and municipal risk management alternatives).
202 Powers, 723 F.2d at 1053, 1055.
203 Historic districts are themselves entities created by the application of
historic preservation ordinances. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104, 107 & n. 1 (1978). These ordinances, a type of aesthetic regulation,
are a time, place, and manner regulation under the First Amendment because
they control the location and manner of certain types of expressive activities in
a narrowly defined geographic area. See Messer v. City of Douglasville, 975 F.2d
1505, 1508-09 (1 lth Cir. 1992).
204 National parks and forests are special types of parks where heightened
aesthetic concerns exist. Although the National Park Service, and not individual
municipalities, promulgates aesthetic regulations governing these areas, the
regulation textural considerations and First Amendment analysis by the courts are
the same. See First Amendment Activities on Public Lands Before the Subcomm.
on Oversight and Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural
Resources, 104th Cong. 1 (1995) [hereinafter First Amendment Activities]
(statement of Hon. Craig Thomas, U.S. Senator from Wyoming). Therefore, the
content of these regulations provides a useful model for analysis by the municipal
practitioner.
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sales of tourist items in these areas,2"5 the architectural appear-
ance of items such as street furniture,2"6 or other conduct not
considered visually or aurally appropriate to the character of the
historic district or park.20 7 The permissible limits of aesthetic
regulation in such areas have not yet been clearly decided by the
Supreme Court,0 8 although a group of lower federal court deci-
205 See Friends of the Vietnam Veterans Mem'l v. Kennedy, 116 F.3d 495,
498 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding constitutional a National Park Service regulation
prohibiting the sale of a number of items, including T-shirts, on the National
Mall). The Mall is a particularly interesting setting because it not only exists as
a politically symbolic public forum, but is also a major recreational park for
residents of Washington, D.C.
206 See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Beacon Hill Architectural Comm'n, 100
F.3d 175, 178 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that a newsrack ban to promote the
municipal goal of maintaining the aesthetic character of a historic district in
Boston is constitutional, and that resulting bans on certain types of structures is
"merely a practical consequence" of application of power to prohibit inappro-
priate architectural elements in the district). The balance between interests of
speech distribution from such "temporary" structures such as leaflet tables and
newsracks, and aesthetics in a historic district is especially fragile and accounts
for the willingness of courts to uphold bans in such special districts. Id. at 187.
207 See, e.g., Gerritsen v. City of Los Angeles, 994 F.2d 570, 575 (9th Cir.)
(holding that a city ordinance requiring a permit for handbill distribution in a
historic park unconstitutional because the requirement was intended to discourage
protest activities), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 915 (1993); Burke v. City of
Charleston, 893 F. Supp. 589, 611 (D.S.C. 1995) (upholding a historic
preservation ordinance regulating the display of an artist's mural visible in a
historic district), vacated and remanded, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 5057 (4th Cir.
1998) (failing to reach the First Amendment issue because the court determined
that the artist lacked standing because he sold the display rights to the mural).
See Landis, supra note 113, at 963 (collecting and analyzing state and federal
cases in which courts discuss whether, or under what circumstances, a restriction
of the use of a public park violates freedom of speech or press rights under the
First Amendment).
208 The Court has noted that it is the nature and pattern of a place's normal
activities that will determine appropriate time, place, and manner regulation.
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972). For example, in City
of Ladue v. Gilleo, the Court examined the constitutionality of residential sign
regulations. 512 U.S. 43 (1994). The Court recognized the significance of a
speech message located at the site of a speaker: "Displaying a sign from one's
own residence often carries a message quite distinct from placing the same sign
somewhere else, or conveying the same text or picture by other means. Precisely
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sions have upheld aesthetic regulations that set stricter limits on
First Amendment expression. °9
Although the public forum is within an area of heightened
aesthetic concern, the synthesized Perry!O'Brien test21" still forms
the basis for determining whether the proposed time, place, and
manner aesthetic regulation is constitutional. While a city has a
stronger basis for its aesthetic interest, avoiding a challenge to these
stricter regulations requires explicit textural language connecting the
asserted aesthetic interest to the means employed to further the
interest.2  Globe Newspaper Co. v Beacon Hill Architectural
because of their location, such signs provide information about the identity of the
'speaker."' Id. at 56. However, the Court did not extend protection to every type
of non-commercial sign in residential locations. Id. at 58 n. 17 ("Nor do we hold
that every kind of sign must be permitted in residential areas. Different
considerations might well apply, for example, in the case of signs [whether
political or otherwise] displayed by residents for a fee . . ").
However, some lower courts have determined that a city has a more
significant interest in aesthetics in designated historic areas than in non-historic
areas, thus providing the impetus for cities to enact more narrow restrictions than
might normally be permitted. See Messer v. City of Douglasville, 975 F.2d 1505,
1508-09 (1 1th Cir. 1992) (holding constitutional a sign ordinance allowing on-
site non-commercial signs while prohibiting off-site non-commercial signs in a
historic district); Burke, 893 F. Supp. at 610.
209 Historically, there has been tension between two competing theories of
public forum doctrine: that of "assured minimum access," arising when a city
decides to ban certain communicative activities in a public forum; and the
narrower "equal access" view, which applies in situations where a city allows
some speakers, but not others, to use the public forum. GUNTHER, supra note 14,
§ 12-4, at 1250. See supra note 38 (comparing the "assured minimum access"
position in Hague v. CIO with the "equal access" position in Massachusetts v.
Davis). Recent lower court decisions suggest a willingness to apply the "equal
access" view, allowing content-neutral bans of certain forms of expression in
areas of heightened aesthetic context. See Globe Newspaper, 100 F.3d at 191;
Messer, 975 F.2d at 1508-09.
20 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). See supra notes 117-119 and accompanying text
(discussing the synthesized Perry/O'Brien test).
211 These regulations are often subject to vagueness challenges, alleging that
the architectural, historic or aesthetic standards intended to be achieved or
preserved are inexplicit. See generally Agathe, supra note 113 (collecting cases
providing examples of textural standards within aesthetic ordinances held not to
be vague).
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Commission is a recent case in which aesthetic regulations
effectively banning newsracks from city sidewalks within a historic
district were upheld. 12 On the authority of the City of Boston,
the Beacon Hill Architectural Commission enacted a set of street
furniture guidelines applicable within the historic Beacon Hill
District. 13 The guidelines were facially challenged by a group of
newspaper publishers, not because they were inexplicit, but because
their effect was to create a newsrack ban.21a The Commission
stated that by regulating the sidewalks through the guidelines, the
municipal interest of preserving the Historic Beacon Hill District
was furthered,215 as had been its mandate since 1955.216 The
court first noted that the degree of protection provided by the
Constitution depends "'on the character of the property at
issue,"""1 in this case the streets and sidewalks of the historic
212 100 F.3d 175, 194 (1st Cir. 1996) (upholding the constitutionality of
Boston's Street Furniture Guidelines that created a ban on newsracks in the
Beacon Hill Historic District). In fact the court went so far as to identify
aesthetics, as advanced in the regulation, as a "colorable non-content-discrimina-
tory" municipal purpose. Id. at 184.
113 The Street Furniture Guidelines, in relevant part, are as follows:
Street furniture, as defined below, shall not be permitted in the
Historic Beacon Hill District with the exception of approved store-front
merchandise stands and those structures erected or placedby authorized
public agencies for public safety and/or public welfare purposes. Street
furniture is defined as any structure erected or placed in the public or
private ways on a temporary or permanent basis.
Authorized public safety/public welfare street furniture includes,
but is not limited to, such structures as street lights, traffic lights, mail
boxes, fire hydrants, street trees, and trash receptacles. Any such
authorized public safety/public welfare street furniture or approved
storefront merchandise stands shall be subject to Commission review
and shall be in keeping with the architectural and historic character of
the District and the criteria for exterior architectural features as
specified in Chapter 616 of the Acts of 1955 as amended.
Id. at 181.
214 Id. at 183.
211 Id. at 179.
216 Id. at 178-79.
217 Id. at 182 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n,
460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983)).
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district. The court then determined that the Street Furniture
Guidelines were content-neutral, 218 and applied an intermediate
level of scrutiny.219 The court found that while the regulations
removed newsracks as a speech medium, other available methods
of distribution were left untouched. 2 ' The regulation was also
determined to be narrowly tailored because it promoted the city's
significant and substantial interest in preserving the aesthetics of the
Historic District, an interest that would not be achieved as
effectively without the regulation.221 The ban was therefore
upheld as a valid content-neutral time, place, and manner restric-
tion.
22
21" The court held:
[There was no] reference to the content of the affected speech, either
in its plain language or in its application. . . . [A]s applied to
newsracks, it operates as a complete ban without any reference to the
content of a given publication whatsoever: uniquely concerned with the
physical structure housing the speech, it restricts only the mode of
distribution and would plainly apply even if they were empty.
Id. at 183. The court further noted that "[this ordinance] seems to be an example
of the very kind of total ban on newsracks that Justice Stevens was willing to
assume arguendo might be constitutional in City of Cincinnati v. Discovery
Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 427-28 (1993)." Id.
219 Id. at 184. The court used as a precedent another First Circuit case,
National Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham, that held that strict scrutiny is
not automatically justified when the practical effect of the ordinance is to
regulate the First Amendment rights of a selectgroup. 43 F.3d 731, 736, 739 (1st
Cir. 1995).
220 Id. at 185.
221 Id. at 188. This holding overturned the lower court ruling in Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Beacon Hill Architectural Commission that struck the newsrack
ban, because the city's aesthetic interests could have been achieved by a design
review of proposed newsracks, as was the case for other types of street furniture
in the historic district, instead of a total ban of newsracks. 847 F. Supp. 178, 194
(D. Mass. 1994).
222 Globe Newspaper, 100 F.3d at 194. While Globe Newspaper is not
currently on appeal, the Supreme Court's holdings involving newsracks and other
installations dispensing speech suggest that the Court may be amenable to the
First Circuit view. The Court has previously held that disseminators of speech
may not make permanent installations on public property. City of St. Louis v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 148 U.S. 92, 98-99 (1893) (holding that a telegraph
company does not have the right to place its poles on public property). Providing
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The final words of the majority opinion in Globe Newspaper
are significant in setting the emerging boundaries of aesthetic
regulations affecting semi-permanent means of dispensing speech,
such as newsracks:
[T]he First Amendment guarantees the right to circulate
publications, it does not guarantee the right to do so
through private structures erected on public property...
[N]ewsracks are nothing more than structures occupying
... public space on the sidewalks, which - with or without
publications within - simply are not immunized from [First
Amendment] regulations. 23
These words could reasonably apply to any temporary structure
used to dispense speech, such as newsstands or bus shelters,
particularly in areas of heightened aesthetic context.
III. THE WELL-DRAWN ORDINANCE
Because each city is unique, with its own goals and aesthetic
character, the purpose of this Note is not to propose a specific
model of aesthetic regulation. However, the framework of case
decisions reveals that courts typically focus on specific textual
aspects of aesthetic regulations when assessing the merits of
vagueness or overbreadth challenges. 24 Courts examine the
ordinance's stated municipal goals and the associated time, place,
that the regulation is content-neutral, the Court has not applied strict scrutiny and
has deferred to legislative determination of the necessity of the regulation to
achieve municipal interests, even when those interests are not explicitly stated in
the ordinance. Compare City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S.
410 (1993) (acknowledging the city's right to choose its municipal interests and
the best means to achieve them, providing there is a "reasonable fit" between
means and ends), with City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S.
750 (1988) (striking a newsrack ordinance allowing such overbroad discretion to
the Mayor that the power could be used to censure). See Michael S. Gruen,
Clearing Sidewalk Newsrack Clutter, 1 CITY LAW 5, 6 (1995) (discussing the
history of newsrack regulation and offering advice on constitutionally permissible
newsrack regulations for New York City).
223 Globe Newspaper, 100 F.3d at 195.
224 See generally supra Part II (discussing the doctrines of vagueness and
overbreadth as applied to challenges to aesthetic regulations).
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and manner regulations used as the means for achieving those
goals, the limitations on the discretion of enforcement officials to
approve or disapprove the regulated expression and the permit
application procedures and insurance requirements that must be met
before the city approves the expression. The text of proposed
aesthetic legislation should address these emphasized elements with
language specifically adapted by the practitioner to achieve the
municipal interests of the individual city.22 The municipal
practitioner should generally keep in mind the following guidelines
while crafting the well-drawn aesthetic ordinance. 26
First, to avoid a vagueness and overbreadth challenge, it is
essential that the ordinance text contain specific, clear, and
consistent regulatory language. 227 This is crucial not only because
225 For example, the New York City Department of Transportation has
recently been reviewing proposals to redesign the city's street furniture, such as
bus shelters, newsstands and public toilets, pursuant to previously promulgated
regulations. Todd W. Bressi, A Stealth Streetscape, OCULUS (published by the
New York Chapter of the American Institute of Architects), Oct. 1997, at 5. The
permissible advertising on these structures is also regulated. Id. While proposals
were submitted in April, 1997, Mayor Rudolph Guiliani's administration has yet
to release financial or design details, or a timetable for decision. Id. Typically in
New York, ordinances or administrative regulations allow for aesthetic review
of street furniture by the Landmarks Commission and the Arts Commission, as
well as community leaders. Id. Such scrutiny helps ensure that city officials will
make responsible aesthetic decisions benefitting the city.
226 Several of these guidelines have been suggested by other commentators.
See First Amendment Activities, supra note 204, at 5 (statement of Robert M.
O'Neil, Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression,
University of Virginia).
227 Legal scholars have suggested that differing interpretive theories and
varying meanings associated with particular words used in statutory text are
themselves to blame for challenges to statutes and ordinances, and therefore it
may be inherently impossible to draft a statute capable of evading a vague and
overbroad challenge. See generally Donna D. Adler, A Conversational Approach
to Statutory Analysis: Say What You Mean and Mean What You Say, 66 Miss.
L.J. 37 (1996). However, even the Supreme Court has noted that "perfect clarity
and precise guidance have never been required, even of regulations that restrict
expressive activity." Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 794 (1989)
(stating that since we are "'[c]ondemned to the use of words, we can never
expect mathematical certainty in our language"') (quoting Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972)). Such linguistic analysis is beyond the
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the municipality seeks to regulate First Amendment activities, but
also because clear language minimizes judicial guesswork about
government intent and the regulatory scope of the ordinance.
Second, the ordinance must be truly content-neutral in its
regulation of speech. Time, place, and manner regulations often
have incidental chilling effects on speech that may not be intended
by the municipality-effects that leave the ordinance vulnerable to
challenge on overbreadth grounds and susceptible to invalidation by
an unsympathetic court.
Third, the municipal practitioner must anticipate that many
challenges will rest on the allegation that no viable alternative
means exist for the particular expression that is regulated by the
ordinance. The ordinance should therefore contain a statement
identifying for a future reviewing court other available means for
dissemination of the regulated speech, thereby providing a showing
of ample alternative channels of communication.
Fourth, the ordinance should provide for procedural due process
allowing for prompt review of administrative decisions that deny
approval for permits to engage in First Amendment expression.228
Not only will this help avoid a judicial determination that the
ordinance grants unbridled discretion to the enforcement official,
but such a procedure also allows an early review of a disputed
permit request before the event date passes and it becomes a de
facto denial. Even a licensing process with well-established
guidelines and standards for denying or granting a permit may be
susceptible to the biases of the system's administrators.
Fifth, although the specific content of the text will be tailored
to particular community goals and interests, the well-drawn
aesthetic ordinance should contain specific organizing features for
the benefit of citizens, as well as for a future court that may be
scope of this Note; however, a vagueness challenge may be blunted by well
chosen textual language understandable to the citizens subject to the regulation.
While it may not be possible to avoid all challenges, by carefully drafting the
ordinance text, successful challenges may be minimized.
228 In City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., the Court stated that
a solid foundation for judicial review of an administrator's decision could only
be achieved if the aesthetic ordinance required that the reviewing official provide
specific and defined reasons for permit denial. 486 U.S. 750, 771 (1988).
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called upon to analyze the challenged text. The ordinance should
contain a preamble setting out clearly and explicitly every munici-
pal interest upon which the city relies in enacting the ordinance, the
reasons they are included and supporting evidence of the necessity
of their inclusion. If appropriate, the preamble may also contain a
brief legislative history underlying the enactment. The proposed
means to achieve each stated interest must be clearly linked back
to the preamble.
The practitioner is urged to bear in mind that a commonly
underutilized municipal interest justifying aesthetic regulations is
aesthetics itself. Aesthetics is often overlooked as an independent
municipal interest, possibly because of historically inconsistent
court responses in cases that have analyzed this goal.229 However,
the ordinance text should explicitly authorize regulation based upon
the city's municipal aesthetic interest in order to enhance the city's
economy, property values, tourism and beauty. The text should
further emphasize that these narrowly drawn regulations provide the
means to correct problems that are inherently aesthetic in nature.
Stating these objectives explicitly and relating them to the proposed
means of regulation will not only test for the practitioner how
narrowly the means are drawn, but will also anticipate judicial
objection and second-guessing of the municipal intent behind
imprecisely stated municipal objectives. 23 °
229 See supra Part I.C for a discussion of the development of aesthetic
regulation in the United States. Compare City Council of Los Angeles v.
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 807 (1984) (stating that a city has the
constitutional power to improve its appearance through the regulation of signs
providing that the text of the ordinance is content-neutral), with Schneider v.
New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939) (stating that a state's presumed interest
in keeping streets clean was insufficient to justify a ban on handbills) (emphasis
added). The Schneider Court applied strict scrutiny even though the ordinance
was not content-based on its face. Id. at 162. In recent cases, when an ordinance
explicitly states that the prevention of litter, or aesthetics in general, is a
municipal interest, strict scrutiny is avoided and lower courts have allowed
regulation of handbill distribution, at least where commercial speech is involved.
See Sciarrino v. City of Key West, 83 F.3d 364, 367-68 (1 1th Cir. 1996).
230 See Vincent, 466 U.S. at 819-20 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (second-
guessing the Court's conclusion that alternative channels for dissemination of the
message were available by examining evidence of the large number of legal and
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An established municipal aesthetic policy applied in the context
of a historic district or park may be sufficient for heightened
regulation if the goal of the heightened regulation and the proposed
means are made explicit.2 3' Most aesthetic regulations that are
subjected to a vagueness and overbreadth challenge set out
municipal goals that are incompletely related to the regulation
methods proposed. For example, while the municipal goals of
public safety and welfare are probably sufficiently related to
regulations affecting the size, placement, supporting structure and
maintenance of newsracks and signs, regulations affecting the
shape, appearance and facing materials are less clearly related to
these stated goals. The legitimate municipal goal of aesthetics
should therefore be included in the goals statement or preamble text
in order to avoid an overbreadth challenge based on an insufficient
connection to the proposed regulation.
Finally, to avoid abridging First Amendment freedoms, the fee
requirements themselves must not be prohibitively expensive. A
challenge may be avoided by providing within the permit procedure
the availability of a hearing to decide on the award of a variance
for economically disadvantaged organizations or individuals.
CONCLUSION
While it may be impossible to create an aesthetic regulation
completely invulnerable to challenge simply because of the inherent
imprecision of statutory interpretation, it is nonetheless possible for
practitioners to draft regulations that will either avoid vagueness or
illegal signs posted in Los Angeles and inferring that signs were a preferred
manner of communication for many speakers).
231 See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Beacon Hill Architectural Comm'n, 100
F.3d 175, 188-89 (1st Cir. 1996). If such an ordinance is challenged, the
practitioner should consider the use of photographic or videotape evidence to
demonstrate the aesthetic characteristics of the historic context or park that the
regulation is intended to preserve, or use expert testimony about the area's
architectural and historic significance. See Sciarrino, 83 F.3d at 368 (illustrating
the city's municipal interest in the prevention of litter through the presentation
of a 30-minute videotape at trial). See also Agathe, supra note 113 (discussing
the use of documentary evidence to substantiate municipal interests).
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overbreadth facial constitutional challenges, or be sustained by a
reviewing court. However, because judicial interpretation of
permissible aesthetic regulation continues to evolve, the municipal
practitioner must keep abreast of the latest First Amendment
decisions affecting the specific types of expression considered for
regulation.
Citizens desire to understand the limits of permissible conduct
and courts prefer that legislators provide that definition. The well-
drawn municipal aesthetic ordinance will eliminate judicial
guesswork by explicitly stating municipal interests and the means
to achieve them while creating clear, non-biased and expeditious
permit and insurance procedures for implementing reasonable
regulation of First Amendment expression in accordance with
community values. The municipal practitioner has the means to
create circumstances that will promote beauty through legal
initiatives, and for good measure, should consider planting a tree.
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